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DANGEROUS WARRANTS
Nirej Sekhon*
Abstract: The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold
standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a “warrant preference” on the
premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures
encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference
with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most
outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article
terms “non-compliance warrants”: summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with
a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor
offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson,
Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this,
warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance
warrants as if they are no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth
Amendment warrant preference.
This Article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and
otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct
unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement
also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests
beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal
justice. The Article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter
unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the Article identifies steps state and local
courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.
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INTRODUCTION
With guns drawn, 150 police officers stormed the dilapidated
apartment building—nearly one officer for every unit.1 The Detroit Police
Department called the operation “Clean Sweep.” Officers would trawl the
building for individuals wanted on outstanding warrants. The police
department suggested that wanted felons were responsible for much of the
crime in the building.2 Officers went door to door, putting residents on
edge, but ultimately netted thirty warrant dodgers.3 The department
declared the operation a success. It failed to mention that virtually none
of the arrestees was a wanted felon. More than two-thirds of the arrests
were based on warrants for failures to appear in traffic court; most of the
remaining one-third also stemmed from relatively minor misconduct.4
Were Clean Sweep’s shock and awe tactics necessary or even intended to
reduce crime? Because arrest warrants for unpaid traffic tickets and other
minor misdeeds are voluminous and far outnumber those for serious
felonies, the police might have guessed that Clean Sweep would net more
bad drivers than actual outlaws. It is possible that the police did know but
were indifferent so long as the highly publicized raid generated a parade
of arrestees for the press waiting outside the building.
The sheer number of outstanding warrants enables aggressive police
enforcement tactics of which Clean Sweep is just one example.5 Such
tactics are fraught with constitutional dangers, as is the judicial practice
of summarily issuing arrest warrants based on trifling misconduct, some
of which is not criminal at all. This Article describes both sets of practices
and the constitutional harms that flow from them. Contrary to courts’ and
commentators’ beliefs, warrants may amplify police discretion rather than
constrain it.
1. Ryan Felton, Operation: Restore Public Relations, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/operation-restore-public-relations/Content?oid=2334953
[http://perma.cc/E2UR-Q34Y].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra section II.A.
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For generations, the Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the
Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police. The Court has
touted a “warrant preference,” stating that a search or seizure conducted
without a warrant is per se unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional.6 This
reflects the Court’s view that Fourth Amendment rights are better
protected when police enforcement choices are subject to judicial review
before execution.7 The warrant preference requires that a “neutral and
detached magistrate” vigorously review police warrant applications.8 In
theory, this should entail a thorough questioning of witnesses’ credibility
and evaluation of whether the police’s factual showing satisfies “probable
cause,” the standard specified by the Fourth Amendment.9 I call this vision
of courts’ role in screening warrant applications the “magisterial ideal.”
Critics have long charged that, in practice, judges do not live up to the
magisterial ideal because warrant hearings are ex parte and cursory.10
Warrant applications are “rubber stamped” with far less scrutiny than the
magisterial ideal presupposes.11 Both the magisterial ideal and criticism
of it assume that warrants are supposed to constrain police discretion.
Both perspectives share the same blind spot. Both focus only on one type
of warrant, the “investigatory warrant”—where police seek judicial
permission to gather evidence or make arrests in order to advance a
specific criminal investigation.12 As suggested by operation Clean Sweep,
however, the majority of outstanding warrants are not of the investigatory
variety at all.
The most common outstanding warrants in the United States are what
I call “non-compliance warrants.”13 These warrants are not intended to
constrain police discretion but rather to secure a defendant’s submission.
Because of their sheer numbers, non-compliance warrants affirmatively
generate, rather than constrain, police discretion. This contravenes the
warrant preference’s spirit by creating powerful incentives for the police
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
7. See id.
8. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
10. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609,
1639–40 (2012) (summarizing critical literature).
11. See id.
12. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14.
13. See infra section II.A.
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to unconstitutionally seize individuals to conduct warrant checks. Noncompliance warrants also play a central but unrecognized role in
perpetuating race and class disparities in our criminal justice system.
Non-compliance warrants are issued for failing to comply with court or
executive orders—for example, failing to appear for a court date, failing
to comply with a probation condition, or failing to pay a traffic fine.14
They do not require a police application and usually take the form of a
bench warrant issued summarily by a judge, court clerk, or probation
official.15 Contrary to the magisterial ideal, judges and police are not
counter-positioned when non-compliance warrants are issued.16 Rather,
court and police interests are aligned, with the former calling upon the
latter to secure the named person.17 Courts are profligate in issuing noncompliance warrants, particularly for relatively minor misconduct, much
of which is not criminal.18 The Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) 2014
investigation of Ferguson, Missouri highlights another example of why
these warrants are dangerous.19
In 2013 alone, the municipal court in Ferguson issued enough noncompliance warrants to account for nearly half the city’s population.20 The
vast majority of these warrants were for failing to appear (FTAs) for
municipal code and traffic violations.21 The DOJ observed that Ferguson
imposed exceptionally high fines for municipal code violations and used
its criminal justice apparatus as a punitive collection agency.22 The city
directed courts and police to maximize the revenue generated by
violations.23 The court did its part by, among other things, creating
Kafkaesque obstacles to challenging citations and wantonly issuing bench
warrants for FTAs.24 These warrants had the advantage, from the
municipality’s perspective, of carrying additional fees.25 The police did
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra section II.A.
See infra section II.A.
See infra section II.A.
The warrant is typically framed as a judicial command. See infra note 130 and discussion.
See infra notes 132–36 and discussion.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT].
20. See id. at 3–4, 42.
21. Id. at 3–4.
22. See id. at 10–15.
23. Id. at 10, 14.
24. See id. at 46–47 (noting that warrants for FTAs were issued without having provided adequate
notice of required appearance date and required full pre-payment of bond in order to challenge
unlawfully imposed warrant).
25. Id.
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their part by aggressively enforcing outstanding warrants, often
discovering them in the course of unconstitutional stops and, of course,
by issuing new citations.26 While Ferguson might be an extreme example,
it is likely different from numerous other jurisdictions in quantity, not
kind.27
Although investigatory and non-compliance warrants are
fundamentally different, the Supreme Court has extended the same
deference to both as if they were identical.28 Most recently, in Utah v.
Strieff,29 the Court held that criminal courts need not provide a remedy
where an officer makes an unconstitutional stop but discovers a valid noncompliance warrant in the course of the stop.30 The bench warrant in
Strieff was for an unresolved parking violation.31 After unconstitutionally
stopping Strieff, discovering the warrant, and arresting him, the officer
searched Strieff incident to arrest and discovered narcotics.32 This
evidence became the basis for a new criminal case against Strieff.33 He
moved to suppress the narcotics.34 The Court held for Utah because the
outstanding bench warrant was “valid . . . and . . . entirely unconnected
with the stop.”35 The Court concluded that arrest was not the fruit of the
constitutional violation but a “ministerial act” that the officer had “a
sworn duty to carry out.”36
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s characterization, an arrest pursuant to
a non-compliance warrant is not “ministerial.”37 Non-compliance
warrants actually create rather than restrain police discretion. As is true
with criminal laws, outstanding warrants create opportunities for police
leniency and severity, both at the institutional and individual levels. This
creates the dangers of arbitrariness and opacity that have worried policediscretion scholars since the 1960s.38

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 10.
See infra section II.A.
See infra section I.B.
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Id. at 2060 (Utah conceded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff).
Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2060 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2062.
Id. at 2062–63.
Id. at 2063.
See infra section II.C.2.
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The sheer number of outstanding non-compliance warrants in
conjunction with their demographic concentration among poor and
minority groups create powerful incentives for police to conduct
unconstitutional stops of individuals who belong to those groups.39 Those
incentives pre-existed Utah v. Strieff and would have continued to exist
even if the case had been decided differently.40 The Supreme Court has
long held that there is no exclusionary remedy for an unconstitutional
seizure where it subsequently emerges that there is probable cause to
detain.41 An outstanding warrant of any variety creates probable cause.
For officers in the field, there will usually be no cost to carrying out
unconstitutional warrant checks, save for the time and energy required to
actually conduct the stop. The limited data that exist suggest that the
warrant hit-rate in low-income minority neighborhoods will be higher
than other neighborhoods.42 This creates the incentive for police to
conduct random unconstitutional checks in the former.43
Warrant enforcement plays a critical role in cementing class and race
disparity in the criminal justice system by creating “arrest feedback.” Not
only do arrests generate warrants and vice versa, but warrant enforcement
can also generate new criminal cases. Over time, police warrant
enforcement and courts’ warrant-issuing practices are recursive,
producing mutually reinforcing demographic effects. Where there are a
disproportionately high number of outstanding warrants for poor and
minority defendants, police will target those communities for warrant
enforcement. In the course of doing so, police will likely identify new
criminal cases. This feedback supplies its own self-supporting rationale
because the demographic profile of those with outstanding warrants
reaffirms pre-existing, racialized notions about crime-prone
neighborhoods and communities.
In Part I, the Article describes the Fourth Amendment’s magisterial
ideal and the warrant preference. Part II, the Article’s analytical core,
demonstrates the prevalence and demographic concentration of noncompliance warrants and shows why this is harmful. Non-compliance
warrants create powerful incentives for police to violate the Constitution,
confer unchecked enforcement discretion, and generate racial disparity.
39. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
40. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan wrote dissents urging a different result in the case. Id. at 2068
(Sotomayor, J. dissenting); id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
41. This is on account of the Frisbie-Ker doctrine. See infra section II.C.1; United States v. Crews,
445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (“Respondent is not himself a suppressible ‘fruit,’ and the illegality of his
detention cannot deprive the Government of the opportunity to prove his guilt . . . .”).
42. See infra section II.B.
43. See infra section II.C.1.

Sekhon – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete)

2018]

DANGEROUS WARRANTS

6/6/2018 9:38 PM

973

Part III identifies the legal and policy prescriptions that flow from Part II.
The Court should create a meaningful remedy for those seized
unconstitutionally but for whom there is an outstanding non-compliance
warrant. In the meantime, local courts have considerable power to limit
non-compliance warrants’ harmful consequences. The Article identifies
specific steps these courts might take.
I.

WARRANTS AND THE MAGISTERIAL IDEAL

The Supreme Court has characterized a warrant as “a judicial mandate
to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest” and any actual arrest
that follows as a “ministerial act.”44 The “magisterial act” is the issuance
of a warrant: it is the magistrate who wields the most significant decisionmaking authority with regard to who is to be searched or seized. This view
is embedded in the Court’s so-called “warrant preference.” It casts
warrant-based searches and seizures as the gold standard of constitutional
permissibility. The warrant preference hinges on an idealized view of the
magistrate’s role: being “neutral and detached,”45 vigorously reviewing
police applications, and granting warrants only where there is a high
likelihood of securing criminal evidence. The magisterial ideal also
provides that warrants, if issued at all, must be limited in scope so as to
minimize interference with suspects’ and third parties’ constitutional
interests. Ironically, the Court’s warrant preference has led it to curtail the
exclusionary remedy for unconstitutional police conduct when that
conduct is based upon an invalid warrant, or, as held in Utah v. Strieff,
when a valid warrant emerges immediately following an unconstitutional
stop.46
A.

The Warrant Preference

A warrant is the gold standard for justifying searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment.47 There are so many exceptions to the
Court’s so-called warrant requirement that the “warrant preference” exists
more as a rhetorical reality than a practical one.48 But the rhetoric
44. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062–63 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)).
45. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
46. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
47. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
48. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“Even before
today’s decision, the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions that it was
basically unrecognizable.”); Oren-Bar & Friedman, supra note 10, at 1612 (noting prevalence of
exceptions).
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expresses a foundational concept of criminal courts’ role in restraining the
police. The Fourth Amendment’s text requires that warrants be
particularized as to place, person, and object of interest.49 The Founders
drafted the warrants clause to eliminate colonial courts’ much-reviled
practice of issuing “general warrants.”50 General warrants authorized
state agents to search and seize without temporal or geographic limitation
or the specification of particular individuals or objects.51 General warrants
were the dangerous warrants of the founding era.
In Katz v. United States,52 the Supreme Court read the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be “reasonable” to
entail a “warrant preference”: a search conducted without a warrant is “per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”53 Whether the
“warrant preference” continues to actually describe what the Fourth
Amendment requires of police is questionable (if it ever did).54 But
rhetorically, if not otherwise, the Court continues to suggest the warrant
preference’s vitality.55 This reflects the settled view that police officers’
enforcement discretion is best vetted by a judicial actor in advance of an
enforcement action.56 Justice Jackson’s formulation in Johnson v. United
States57 remains among the most eloquent formulations of the warrant
preference:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. . . . When the right of privacy must

49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 99–101 (1937).
51. See id.
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. Id. at 357.
54. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Patel, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015); Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 338 (2008); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
56. United States v. Chadwick, 43 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
57. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided
by a judicial officer, not by a policeman . . . .58
This language suggests the essential features of the warrant preference.
First, and most importantly, Justice Jackson explicitly articulates the
“magisterial ideal” in terms of judge and police being counter-positioned.
Magistrates are to serve as “neutral and detached” bulwarks against
officers’ potentially blinding “zealous[ness].”59 This framing rightly
presupposes that police officers will systematically and severely discount
civilian privacy and liberty interests in favor of their crime-control
mandate. Search and seizure targets do not have a formal, pre-deprivation
opportunity to be heard.60 Magistrates consider applications ex parte. A
search’s precise target may be uncertain. Informing a known target of an
impending search or arrest might undermine the state’s legitimate crimecontrol purpose—many a target would just as well flee or destroy
evidence.61 But the ex parte nature of the application means that the
magistrate must account for the absent parties’ interests.
The magisterial ideal hinges on “neutral[ity] and detach[ment],” which
ensures that the search target’s interests are accounted for.62 Magistrates
are to vigorously review the police’s facts regarding probable cause—
assuring themselves of witnesses’ credibility and that the established facts
actually demonstrate a sufficiently high probability of guilt. In this vein,
the Court has held it unconstitutional for a jurisdiction to create formal
incentives for approving warrants.63 Even if issuing a warrant is justified,
the magisterial ideal requires that the judge appropriately limit the scope
of law enforcement conduct so as to minimize the intrusion endured by
the target and third parties whose constitutional interests may be
implicated.64

58. Id. at 13–14.
59. Id. Commentators have long questioned the presupposition that magistrates can be neutral and
detached in practice. See George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth of
Magisterial Discretion, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1990); Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search
Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1207 (1987).
60. Due process typically entails the right to some kind pre-deprivation hearing in the civil context,
for instance if the government proposes to interfere with a property interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (deprivation of Social Security benefits).
61. See Nock, supra note 59, at 12.
62. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14.
63. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 251 (1977) (invalidating system in which magistrates
were compensated for each warrant issued).
64. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560–63 (2004) (holding warrant invalid unless issuing
magistrate specifies scope of permissible law enforcement conduct).
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Critics have long charged that, practically speaking, actual magistrates
are unable to provide the kind of rigorous pre-deprivation review that the
magisterial ideal supposes.65 Without an adversarial process, magistrates
are unable to meaningfully review the facts presented in officers’ warrant
affidavits. That problem is compounded when police forum shop and
magistrates have heavy caseloads.66 Officers will be inclined to forum
shop for those magistrates who are least inclined to question officers’
applications.67 The incentives to conduct a searching review will be
further diminished by the powerful docket clearing incentives that most
criminal court magistrates confront.68 These structural features will lead
magistrates to issue “rubber stamp” approvals for all but glaringly
egregious warrant applications. The empirical evidence supporting this
conclusion is dated,69 but critics’ assessment of the incentives confronting
magistrates remains true. That said, limited empirical evidence suggests
that the “hit rate” for warrant-based searches is higher than it is for nonwarrant-based searches.70 This suggests a second theoretical underpinning
for the warrant preference, one recently highlighted by Professors
Friedman and Bar-Gill.71
When police officers are forced to systematically consider and
articulate the bases for searches or seizures in advance, the constitutional
quality of those enforcement actions will improve.72 There are two reasons
for this. First, as Friedman and Bar-Gill emphasized, the pressure to think
about and articulate the reasons for an enforcement action is likely to
discourage officers from engaging in unconstitutional conduct.73 One
hopes that officers will hear themselves articulating patently
unconstitutional reasons for an enforcement action and think the better of
it.74 Even if one does not fully accept this premise, it is plausible to think
that officers take greater care investigating cases when they anticipate
65. See RONALD ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 422–23 (2016)
(summarizing criticism); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 10, at 1639–40 (same); Nock, supra note
59, at 3–4 (characterizing notion of neutral and detached magistrate a “myth”).
66. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 422–23.
67. See id.
68. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 270–72 (1992).
69. See ALLEN, supra note 65, at 422 (summarizing findings).
70. See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 913,
922–23 (2009) (summarizing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 20
(1985)).
71. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 10, at 1641.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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applying for a warrant.75 If that is generally true, it accounts for why
warrant searches are more likely to generate contraband and undercuts the
“rubber stamping” concerns articulated above. Second, as the late
Professor Bill Stuntz noted, requiring police to obtain a warrant shortcircuits judges’ inclinations to engage in post hoc constitutional
rationalizing when a police search or seizure is fruitful.76 When
challenged after the fact, courts will view the constitutional challenge with
a jaundiced eye because of deep-seated anxiety about letting guilty
defendants go free.77 In contrast, reviewing enforcement action before it
occurs permits a more clear-eyed judicial evaluation of police’s reasons.
If one accepts the basic premises of the magisterial ideal, then one will
view the most significant moments of law enforcement discretion as
playing out in advance of an actual warrant-based search or seizure. Of
course, there are choices to be made as to how and when to execute a
warrant once issued.78 But the most significant questions—whether to
search or seize at all and if so, how extensively—will have been decided
by a judge in advance, rendering the actual search and seizure
“ministerial.”79 That characterization is particularly apt where a warrant
is specifically assigned to officers for execution: those officers are left to
carry out discretionary decisions made by others.80
B.

Exclusion and the Warrant Preference

The warrant preference has led the Court to create a “good faith”
exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where police have obtained a
warrant that is found to be defective following execution. Ordinarily, any
evidence that is the product of a Fourth Amendment violation is
inadmissible against the defendant.81 The good faith exception to
exclusion is tantamount to giving police the benefit of the doubt when
they apply for a warrant. In theory, that should encourage police to apply

75. See id.
76. See William J. Stuntz, The Warrant and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,
892–93 (1991).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38–39 (2003) (waiting fifteen to twenty seconds
after knocking and announcing before forcibly entering dwelling pursuant to warrant “reasonable”
under Fourth Amendment).
79. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062–63 (2016) (citing United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)).
80. See EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 156 (2004) (discussing NYPD warrant execution teams).
81. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963).
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for warrants because they will have greater assurance of evidence being
admitted than if they proceeded without one.
In United States v. Leon,82 the police obtained a search warrant for
Leon’s home based upon a police-corroborated tip that he was distributing
narcotics.83 The initial tip came from a reliable source, but police
nonetheless conducted an “extensive investigation” to corroborate the tip
prior to applying for a warrant.84 Upon executing the warrant, the police
discovered large quantities of narcotics.85 Leon successfully moved to
suppress the narcotics evidence in the criminal case against him.86 The
trial court concluded that even though the police had relied in “good faith”
on what appeared to be a valid warrant, it was actually constitutionally
deficient because the magistrate incorrectly concluded that there was
probable cause to search Leon’s home.87 The Supreme Court agreed that
the search was unconstitutional, but nonetheless held the seized narcotics
admissible.88 The Court reasoned that where police and courts act in good
faith, there is nothing to “deter”—and deterrence is the only function that
the exclusionary rule serves.89 “Reasonable minds frequently may differ
on the question of whether a particular affidavit establishes probable
cause.”90 So one cannot fault a magistrate for making a mistake, the Court
reasoned. Nor can one fault an officer for being no wiser for the
magistrate’s error.
Leon’s good faith exception was subsequently extended to different
kinds of warrants and criminal justice errors. In Arizona v. Evans91 and
Herring v. United States,92 the Court applied Leon to bench warrants93
without recognizing any difference between them and the investigatory
warrant at issue in Leon. A bench warrant is usually issued without any
application from the police. A defendant’s failure to appear is among the

82. 468 U.S. 897 (1983).
83. Id. at 901–03.
84. Id. at 901.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 903.
87. Id. at 904. There is no good faith where the officer unreasonably relies on what is an obviously
defective warrant or where a magistrate behaves egregiously in issuing it. Id. at 914–15.
88. Id. at 925–26.
89. Id. at 916–17.
90. Id. at 914.
91. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
92. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
93. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14.
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most common bases for a bench warrant.94 Nor was the “error” in these
cases a magistrate’s reasonable mistake regarding a contestable, factual
question. Rather, both Evans and Herring involved avoidable clerical
errors.95 In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court held evidence admissible
against Evans even though it was seized following his arrest based upon
a court clerk’s erroneous computer database entry indicating an
outstanding warrant.96 Similarly, in Herring, the Court refused to exclude
evidence seized following an arrest based upon an invalid bench warrant
where a police department clerk failed to note that the warrant had been
quashed.97 In both Evans and Herring, the arresting officers were not, and
likely could not have been, aware of the clerical errors regarding the
outstanding warrants. In Evans the Court credited the trial court’s
conclusion that, as far as the officer was concerned, he was “bound to
arrest” and “would [have been] derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest.”98
If one accepts the Court’s view that the exclusionary rule is designed only
to deter police officers (as opposed to courts or clerks),99 then Evans and
Herring are on firm footing. But what happens if the police officer’s
unconstitutional conduct precipitates an outstanding warrant’s discovery?
Recently in Utah v. Strieff, the Court denied exclusion in a case where
the outstanding warrant was valid but would not have been discovered
absent the police officer’s unconstitutional conduct.100 Utah conceded that
the officer in Strieff seized Strieff without reasonable suspicion in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.101 Ordinarily, the exclusionary rule
would preclude the state from using any evidence seized as a result of the
unconstitutional seizure.102 In Strieff, however, following the
unconstitutional seizure, the officer discovered an outstanding bench
warrant that authorized Strieff’s arrest.103 The Fourth Amendment permits
a full search of a suspect’s person “incident to a lawful arrest” to ensure
that the suspect is unable to harm the officer with a concealed weapon or

94. See infra section II.B.
95. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 138; Evans, 514 U.S. at 4.
96. Evans, 514 U.S. at 4.
97. Herring, 555 U.S. at 138.
98. Evans, 514 U.S. at 15.
99. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Christopher Slobogin, The
Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 349–50 (2013)
(summarizing contributing-symposium authors’ criticisms).
100. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016).
101. Id.
102. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1962).
103. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
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destroy evidence.104 When announcing this per se rule in United States v.
Robinson,105 the Court noted that officers may search incident to a “lawful
arrest,”106 a condition that was clearly unsatisfied in Strieff. In dicta, the
Strieff Court hinted that the outstanding bench warrant might retroactively
cure the unconstitutional seizure, but it declined to anchor its actual
holding in this unorthodox principle.107
Instead, the Court anchored its holding in “attenuation doctrine,”108
which creates an exception to the general rule that evidence seized as a
result of an unconstitutional seizure must be excluded.109 Where there is a
“break” in the causal chain linking unconstitutional conduct and evidence
seized, the state may use the evidence against the defendant.110 Under
Brown v. Illinois,111 three factors suggest a causal break: a significant
break in “temporal proximity” separating the constitutional violation from
the evidence’s discovery, “the presence of intervening circumstances,”
and “the purpose and flagrancy of the official conduct.”112
Strieff concluded that the pre-existing warrant for Strieff’s arrest
satisfied the Brown factors, with particular emphasis on the second one.113
The Court’s reasoning leaned heavily on its earlier decision in Segura v.
United States.114 In Segura, law enforcement unlawfully seized the
contents of an apartment by entering it and then securing it pending
application for a search warrant.115 The magistrate issued a warrant based
upon an application that contained only information learned in advance of
the unlawful seizure.116 The Segura Court concluded that the warrant was
therefore an “independent source”: it would have been granted even if the
illegal seizure had never occurred.117 According to the Court, the illegal
seizure in Segura did not ultimately compromise the magisterial ideal.
104. See United States v. Robinson 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In turn, any evidence of a new crime
discovered in the course of a search incident to arrest would be admissible under the “plain view”
exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990).
105. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
106. See id. at 235.
107. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
108. Id. at 2061.
109. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1962).
110. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061.
111. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975).
112. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04).
113. Id. at 2062 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)).
114. 468 U.S. 796 (1982).
115. Id. at 800–04.
116. See id. at 800–01.
117. Id. at 813–15.
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The problem with anchoring Strieff in Segura is that the warrant for
Strieff’s arrest preceded the illegal seizure and was only discovered as a
result of that unconstitutional conduct.
The majority’s analysis of the Brown factors failed to ask whether the
officer foresaw that there would be an outstanding warrant for Strieff even
though foreseeability is the touchstone of the proximate cause analysis
upon which attenuation is based.118 Both Justices Kagan and Sotomayor,
in separate dissents, noted how readily foreseeable it must have been,
given outstanding warrants’ prevalence in Utah, particularly for lowincome, racial minorities.119 The majority assumed that police in Utah
were not routinely stopping individuals without cause to do warrant
checks.120 The majority did, however, leave room for future defendants to
move for exclusion in a case like Strieff’s where there was evidence of
“systemic or recurrent” pattern of such unconstitutional stops.121 How a
defendant might go about making such a showing, however, is unclear.
While Strieff is not a model of analytical clarity, the result is consistent
with what has become a long line of cases limiting the exclusionary rule’s
availability whenever the deterrent effect on police is even arguably
unclear.122 If one accepts the Court’s account of the exclusionary remedy
as purely deterrence-based,123 it is difficult to see what marginal
deterrence would be achieved by excluding the narcotics evidence
retrieved from Strieff incident to his arrest. Having discovered the warrant
for Strieff’s arrest, there was little to prevent the police officer from
holding Strieff or prosecutors from proceeding on the underlying warrant
118. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id.
at 2072–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 2072–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 2063 (majority opinion).
121. Id.
122. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (denying exclusion where police
complied with substantive Fourth Amendment rule later found to be invalid); Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 138–39 (2008) (same where arrest was based upon invalid warrant); Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594–95 (2006) (same where police violated “knock and announce” rule);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1995) (same where arrest based on invalid warrant); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1983) (same); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489–94 (1976) (same
for Fourth Amendment violation raised in habeas corpus proceeding).
123. The Court has come to settle on deterring future law enforcement misconduct as the only
rationale for the exclusionary remedy. See supra note 122. Commentators do not accept that this is
the only rationale for the exclusionary remedy. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption,
and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419,
423–24 (2013); Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The
Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 49
(2010). Nor should they, given that the Court itself has provided additional rationales when extending
the exclusionary remedy to the States. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657–59 (1961).
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offense. Denying the State evidence seized incident to arrest for a new
criminal case would not have likely altered the already compelling
incentives for police to conduct unconstitutional warrant-check stops.124
The result in Strieff seems particularly consistent with the results in
Evans and Herring. Of course, in those cases, the arrests were based on
invalid warrants. The Court, however, still permitted the State to use
incriminating evidence seized incident to arrest even though the State had
no constitutional basis to hold the suspect absent the contraband. In Strieff,
the outstanding bench warrant was actually valid, meaning the State was
entitled to hold him separate and apart from the evidence seized incident
to arrest. The Strieff Court invoked the warrant preference, noting that a
warrant is a “judicial mandate . . . to conduct a search or make an
arrest.”125 Once a warrant has issued, the most significant and potentially
dangerous dimension of police discretion has, in theory, been accounted
for. Accordingly, the Strieff Court characterized a warrant arrest as a
“ministerial act that was independently compelled” by the warrant.126 Of
course the problem with this gloss in Strieff was that the officer was
unaware of the warrant’s existence when he first stopped the defendant in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.127
II.

NON-COMPLIANCE WARRANTS AND POLICE
DISCRETION

The Supreme Court developed the warrant preference in cases
involving “investigatory warrants”—warrants that appear to conform with
the magisterial ideal, as was true in Leon. The sparse data that are
available, however, suggest that most outstanding warrants in the United
States are not of this variety at all. They are what I call “non-compliance
warrants.” As described in section A below, non-compliance warrants do
not aspire to the magisterial ideal. In the aggregate, these warrants create
many of the constitutional dangers the Court’s warrant preference is
supposed to guard against.
As described in section B, non-compliance warrants number in the
millions and likely constitute the majority of outstanding warrants in the

124. But see Michael Kimberly, Comment, Discovering Arrest Warrants: Intervening Police
Conduct and Foreseeability, 118 YALE L.J. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing courts should suppress evidence
discovered incident to arrest where foreseeable that an unconstitutional stop would result in the
discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant).
125. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 n.21).
126. Id. at 2063.
127. Id. at 2056.
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United States at any given time. It is difficult to make conclusive
quantitative claims about outstanding warrants nationwide because data
collection is spotty at best.128 From the little data that can be gleaned from
local sources, one can be confident that these warrants are not just
pervasive but are also demographically concentrated among the poor and
minorities. This in turn means that officers will reasonably be able to
assume that the “hit rate” for outstanding warrants will be higher in poor,
minority neighborhoods than elsewhere.
Section C below demonstrates how, in the aggregate, outstanding noncompliance warrants amplify law enforcement discretion in a manner that
is fundamentally at odds with the warrant preference and the magisterial
ideal. Outstanding non-compliance warrants incentivize unconstitutional
seizures. They also generate a species of police enforcement discretion
that is homologous to the discretion created by the criminal law itself and
is problematic for many of the same reasons. Police discretion and racial
disparity often go hand in hand. Non-compliance warrants are no
exception. They generate what I call “arrest feedback,” which can
exponentially increase race and class disparity in the criminal justice
system.
A.

Non-Compliance Warrants

The vast majority of outstanding warrants are not of the “investigatory”
species preferred by the Court. Rather, most outstanding warrants are
“non-compliance warrants.” These warrants do not reflect the magisterial
ideal as a matter of theory, let alone practice. This section describes noncompliance warrants’ key theoretical and empirical features.
First, as the title suggests, a non-compliance warrant is an arrest
warrant issued for failing to comply with a legal obligation imposed on an
individual, typically by a court or executive official in connection with a
criminal or traffic-related proceeding.129 Less frequently, the obligation is
imposed in connection with a civil proceeding. Like an investigatory
arrest warrant, a non-compliance warrant authorizes police officers to
arrest a specific individual.130 But the two operate towards different ends.

128. David M. Bierie, Fugitives in the United States, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 327, 329 (2014).
129. In some jurisdictions, probation officers and court clerks have the authority to issue bench
warrants without prior judicial approval. See NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
§ 23:13 (1999).
130. In most states, this is framed in terms of a judicial “command[]” to arrest, see, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1529 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-46 (2015), a point noted by the Supreme
Court in Utah v. Strieff. 136 S. Ct. at 2062. As discussed in detail below however, that a bench warrant
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With an investigatory warrant, the question is not just whether police will
be permitted to interfere with an individual’s liberty or privacy interest,
but whether the individual will be forcibly drawn into a criminal court’s
jurisdiction. Should police be permitted to put the suspect on the path to
becoming a defendant?131 In contrast, with non-compliance warrants, the
question is how best to achieve submission from a defendant or convict
who is already within the court’s jurisdiction.
The most common example of a non-compliance warrant is for failing
to appear before a court. When a defendant does not appear for a court
date, judges typically have the authority to issue a “bench warrant” for the
individual’s arrest.132 The most common context in which individuals fail
to appear is in the traffic context, where the obligation to appear is
imposed by a police officer in the course of issuing a citation. Failure to
pay the fine by the specified date or to appear in court for the scheduled
hearing will often result in an arrest warrant. Similarly, a judge may issue
a bench warrant for criminal defendants who fail to appear for any
hearings at which their appearance was required; judges often have
discretion to compel defendant’s presence at any hearing they choose.133
Another common species of non-compliance warrant is a “violator’s
warrant” issued for a probationer or parolee who (there is reason to think)
has failed to satisfy one or more conditions of release.134 The conditions
that a judge might impose as part of a probationary sentence are vast,
including payment of various fines, attending counseling, obtaining
substance abuse treatment, or submitting to drug testing.135 Failure to
satisfy any one of these conditions may result in a judge issuing a warrant
for the probationer’s arrest. Some states even allow probation officers to
issue arrest warrants without judicial approval.136 Non-compliance
warrants may sometimes even be issued in order to enforce conditions that
were imposed in a civil proceeding. For example, family court judges are
often authorized to issue bench warrants for a parent—typically a father—
is, formally speaking, a command does not extinguish the discretion that police typically enjoy to
enforce (or not enforce) such warrants. See infra section II.C.2.
131. This distinction is expressed, for example, in the distinction drawn between a “warrant of
arrest” and a “bench warrant” under New York Law. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20 (McKinney
2017).
132. Different jurisdictions embrace different names for bench warrants such as “writs of arrest”
or “capias warrants.”
133. Presence can also be required by statute. For an example of how requiring defendants to appear
can be used to generate public revenue, see DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 48.
134. See COHEN, supra note 129, § 23:12.
135. See id.
136. See id. § 23:13.
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who has failed to make payments or otherwise comply with a childsupport order.137
A second feature of non-compliance warrants that is intimately related
to the first is that judges and police are aligned rather than counterpositioned as the warrant preference and magisterial ideal presuppose.
The police apply for an investigatory warrant ex parte, and the
magistrate’s task is to ensure absent parties’ constitutional interests are
accounted for.138 In contrast, courts issue non-compliance warrants of
their own accord and then turn to the police to execute them at their behest.
Non-compliance warrants are not formally ex parte, but there is usually
little if any practical opportunity for the defendant’s interests to be
considered. For example, defendants are usually not represented by
counsel at traffic hearings. Similarly, those accused of probation
violations are not constitutionally entitled to counsel for probation
revocation proceedings, let alone for a warrant hearing if there is one.139
Third, courts typically have wider discretion to issue (or not issue) noncompliance warrants than they do investigatory warrants. For example,
California law dictates that an arrest warrant “shall” issue upon the
police’s showing of probable cause.140 In contrast, California law is
permissive with regard to bench warrants: a judge “may” issue a bench
should an individual fail to appear.141 But even where this distinction is
not formally expressed, it likely exists as a practical matter. To the extent
that officers submit a warrant application that demonstrates probable
cause, a judge is likely to feel compelled to grant it.142
Because non-compliance warrants are designed to secure submission,
they exist on a spectrum with other coercive, behavior-inducing
techniques. Among the least coercive options is for a judge to simply
postpone the court matter requiring the defendant’s presence. State laws
may also create a range of options depending on the nature of the
proceeding. Some states, for example, allow for the suspension of an
alleged traffic violator’s driver’s license.143 Similarly, in the probation
137. See Nirej Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, 17 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 176, 193–96 (2014).
138. See supra section I.A (discussing warrant preference and magisterial ideal).
139. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784–85 (1973).
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (West 2017).
141. Id. § 978.5(a). But see FED R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (upon request from government, court “must[ ]
issue a warrant” for defendant that fails to appear).
142. This, again, is the basis for “rubber stamping” criticism that has been often leveled against
warrant. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying discussion.
143. See Larry Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due
Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 16–17, 16 n.64
(summarizing state laws).
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context, judges have a range of coercive options for inducing
compliance.144
The existence of coercive options, however, does not necessarily mean
that judges exercise their formal discretion with sensitivity to the unique
circumstances of any particular defendant’s case. In most state and local
courts, the opposite is true.145 Non-compliance warrants tend to be issued
in rote fashion and in high volume. Most state and local criminal and
traffic courts are examples of high-volume courts. Time and resource
constraints lead such courts to deliver an abbreviated version of the
process popularly associated with criminal law. Many have called this
“assembly-line justice.”146 Assembly-line justice does not permit serious
inquiry into whether individuals are actually guilty, let alone why they
failed to appear. An absent defendant represents an opportunity to quickly
move onto the next case. Even if a judge were inclined to inquire as to
why a particular defendant failed to appear, there would frequently be no
one to question. The judge is likely to just issue a bench warrant. Where
defendants fail to appear for proceedings in which they are represented,
judges might elect not to issue warrants if counsel proffer compelling
explanations for the absence. But the more crowded a court’s docket the
more perfunctory such inquiries will be, and the more inclined the judge
to issue a warrant and move on to other cases.147
Fourth, non-compliance warrants do not generally operate as directives
to specific officers to seek out and arrest particular individuals. Instead,
non-compliance warrants tend to function as “red flags” in law
enforcement databases. These warrants remain suspended in the digital
ether until an officer comes across the individual in the future, identifies
the outstanding warrant, and has reason to execute it.148 State law
sometimes requires police agencies to enter outstanding warrants into
federal, state, and local databases.149 The entries consist of information
identifying the suspect/defendant along with information regarding the
nature of the warrant issued. Law enforcement may also include
information regarding the so-called “pick-up radius” which signals the
jurisdiction’s willingness to expend resources to obtain the

144. See Sekhon, supra note 137, at 187 (summarizing techniques available and judicial
discretion).
145. See FEELEY, supra note 68, at 225–27.
146. See Sekhon, supra note 137, at 190.
147. See FEELEY, supra note 68, at 270–72.
148. See infra section II.C.2 (describing individual officers’ discretion).
149. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 980 (West 2017).
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suspect/defendant if apprehended outside the jurisdiction.150 Some police
departments may focus on enforcing the most serious non-compliance
warrants. For example, in jurisdictions that have dedicated parole and
probation officers, specific officers may execute warrants for individuals
alleged to have violated the terms of supervised release.151 But even there,
it is likely to be only the most serious cases that receive attention from
these officers.
The less serious the offense, and the more congested the docket, the
less likely that a specific officer will be charged with executing the
warrant or that the issuing jurisdiction will pick up the suspect if
apprehended outside the jurisdiction. For example, resource constraints
make it impossible for most jurisdictions to dispatch specific officers to
arrest those who fail to appear for traffic violations.152 Jurisdictions are
also unlikely to expend resources to pick up such a suspect from a
neighboring jurisdiction, let alone extradite the suspect from out of state,
even if detained over a warrant. That means that law enforcement in most
jurisdictions will not arrest an individual pursuant to an outstanding
warrant unless it is clear the person is within the pick-up radius specified
in the database.153
Although data are spotty at best,154 it is safe to assume that the majority
of outstanding warrants in the United States are non-compliance warrants,
not investigatory warrants. The next section explains why.
B.

Pervasiveness and Demographic Concentration

The number of misdemeanors and traffic cases in the United States
outpace felony cases by an order of magnitude,155 making it virtually
certain that these cases generate the most non-compliance warrants in the
United States. Extrapolating from the little data that are available on
outstanding warrants confirms the intuition that most outstanding
warrants in the United States are non-compliance warrants based upon
150. See, e.g., CINCINNATI POLICE DEP’T, POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE MANUAL 12.727
(2010), http://cincinnati-oh.gov/police/department-references/police-department-procedure-manual/
[http://perma.cc/L667-5BKM].
151. See COHEN, supra note 134, § 23:16.
152. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 56 (noting this point for Ferguson municipal court).
153. See Natalie Tendall, Why Some Criminals Are Getting Away with Their Crime, 2 NEWS (May
14, 2015, 6:11 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20171018031013/http:/wdtn.com/investigative-sto
ry/why-some-criminals-are-getting-away-with-their-crime/) [https://perma.cc/XVQ8-JWYR].
154. Bierie, supra note 128, at 329 (no comprehensive empirical research on the question).
155. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2011).
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misdemeanor or traffic offenses.156 National and state databases contain
records of nearly eight million outstanding warrants, more than half of
which are for minor crimes, traffic-related offenses, and violations of civil
orders like child support obligations.157 This understates the total number
of outstanding warrants because state and national databases are biased in
favor of warrants for more serious crimes, most of which are likely to
involve investigatory warrants.158 Local police agencies enter warrants
into national and state databases in part to signal (to other jurisdictions)
how willing they are to expend resources on extraditing the wanted
individual.159 Separate and apart from federal and state databases, many
urban and suburban jurisdictions maintain their own local databases.160
The number of total outstanding warrants in the United States would
require a tally of all these local databases’ contents. That number is sure
to be much higher than eight million. For example, the outstanding
warrants for FTAs on NYPD-issued citations for minor offenses, often
156. See GREG HAGER, KY. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 236,
IMPROVED COORDINATION AND INFORMATION COULD REDUCE THE BACKLOG OF UNSERVED
WARRANTS vii, ix (2005), http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/rr326.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPB6-ECC4]
(most outstanding warrants in Kentucky are bench warrants for minor misconduct); SCI.
APPLICATIONS INT’L CORP. & RANDALL GUYNES & RUSSEL WOLFF, INST. LAW & JUSTICE,
UNSERVED ARREST WARRANTS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 12–13, 23 (2004), http://www.ilj.org/
publications/docs/Unserved_Arrest_Warrants.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP65-WSSA] (same for
Montgomery County, Maryland and Hennepin County, Minneapolis) [hereinafter UNSERVED ARREST
WARRANTS STUDY]; Andrea F. Siegel, In Anne Arundel, Tax Refunds Lure People with Outstanding
Warrants to Come Clean, BALT. SUN (Mar. 17, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-0317/news/bs-md-ar-tax-refund-warrant-20130312_1_warrants-sheriff-ron-bateman-maryland-sheriffs
[http://perma.cc/4FLH-ACYF] (three-fourths of outstanding warrants in large suburban Baltimore
county are bench warrants for traffic and minor offenses); Brief for Respondent at 1–5, Utah v. Strieff,
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373) (summarizing additional sources of data)
[hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
157. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2014, at tbl.5a (2015) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS].
158. Bierie, supra note 128, at 329.
159. Id.
160. Such local databases are common and will typically reflect a fuller record of all the warrants
issued by a jurisdiction. Many warrants for minor violations may not be eligible for inclusion in
federal and state databases. See, e.g., CITY OF VA. BEACH POLICE DEP’T, WARRANT TRACKING AND
SERVICE FIELD GUIDE 4 (2015), https://www.vbgov.com/government/departments/police/
Documents/WarrantTracking%20and%20Service%20%20Field%20Guide.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HQ9Z-TX2M] (noting that local database will contain more comprehensive record
of local warrants than federal and state databases); TEXARKANA, TEX. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL
ORDERS MANUAL § 3 (2015), http://ci.texarkana.tx.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2677 [http://per
ma.cc/EK8T-HPYW] (same); see also CITY OF MILWAUKEE, FIRE & POLICE COMMISSION, FPC
INFORMATIONAL MEMORANDUM CONFIRMATION OF WARRANTS PRIOR TO ARREST (2013),
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cityFPC/Reports/130505FPCMemoreWarrants.pdf
[http://perma.cc/53P3-LJUD] (noting existence of local database).
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called “desk summons,” are the equivalent of more than 15% of all records
in federal and state databases.161
Recent media reports suggest that in New York City alone there are
over one million outstanding warrants for FTAs on “desk summons”—
police issued-citations for minor offenses.162 New York City police have
discretion to issue “summons” in lieu of arrest for a host of minor offenses
such as drinking in public, obstructing a sidewalk, jumping a subway
turnstile, and so on.163 Aggressive enforcement against minor offenses has
been central to so-called “broken windows” policing in New York City, a
policing strategy that purports to reduce serious crimes by eliminating the
“disorder” that encourages perpetrators of more serious crimes.164 Desk
summons may seem gentler than arresting alleged violators outright, but
when such individuals fail to appear in court on a summons or pay a fine,
or if there is a processing error on the city’s part, an arrest warrant will
typically issue.165 In 2014, warrants for FTAs issued in more than one
third of summons cases.166
Outside of New York City, traffic infractions constitute a significant
portion of municipal and county court dockets. Correspondingly, they
tend to generate significant numbers of FTAs. For example, a 2004 study
focusing on outstanding warrants in suburban Washington, D.C. and
suburban Minneapolis also concluded that most outstanding warrants
were bench warrants for failing to appear in court on traffic-related and
other minor charges.167 Seventy-two percent of the outstanding warrants
in the suburban D.C. county were for FTAs or probation violations.168
One-third of those FTAs were traffic-related, while another 27% were for
minor offenses.169 In the suburban Minneapolis County, nearly half the

161. See Allegra Kirkland, How 1.2 Million New Yorkers Ended up with Arrest Warrants, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2015, 9:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-12-million-new-yorkers-end
ed-up-with-arrest-warrants-2015-8 [http://perma.cc/GL3J-L2QM]; Sarah Ryley et al., EXCLUSIVE:
Daily News Analysis Finds Racial Disparities in Summonses in ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/summons-brokenwindows-racial-disparity-garner-article-1.1890567 [https://perma.cc/C2Y5-3HSW].
162. See Kirkland, supra note 161.
163. See Ryley et al, supra note 161.
164. See id.; Kirkland, supra note 161.
165. See Kirkland, supra note 161.
166. See Michael Schwirtz, New York City Plans to Transform Summons Process, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2015, at A21.
167. UNSERVED ARREST WARRANTS STUDY, supra note 156, at 12–13, 23.
168. Id. at 13.
169. Id. at 14.
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outstanding warrants stemmed from traffic offenses and another 20%
were for minor offenses.170
Ferguson, Missouri presents a troubling case study of non-compliance
warrants’ overuse. The DOJ investigated Ferguson after Michael Brown’s
shooting death sparked long-simmering community resentments.171 The
DOJ’s report highlighted the extent to which the city used its criminal
justice machinery to extract revenue from Ferguson’s citizens.172 Central
to this scheme was aggressive enforcement against “minor violations such
as parking infractions, traffic tickets, or housing code violations,” many
of which carried unusually high fines in comparison to nearby
jurisdictions.173 The municipal court was profligate in issuing bench
warrants for failures to pay and appear, issuing 9,000 warrants in 2013
alone. This amounted to one warrant for every two Ferguson residents.174
Compounding matters for Ferguson residents, the warrants carried
additional fees. While Ferguson was extreme in its unitary focus on
revenue, other municipalities in St. Louis County appear to have taken a
similar approach.175 And revenue motives likely inform even large cities’
interest in citations and warrants.176
Evidence and intuition suggest that outstanding non-compliance
warrants will not be evenly distributed across a jurisdiction. Rather, the
demographic and geographic distribution of warrants will likely reflect
(and reinforce)177 police enforcement patterns. To the extent that the poor
and minorities are overrepresented in most jurisdictions’ criminal justice
systems, the same holds true for those who have outstanding noncompliance warrants. Few jurisdictions make information about
outstanding warrants available, and fewer still provide demographic
information. There are a few exceptions. For example, in Virginia Beach,
approximately 50% of outstanding warrants listed in the publicly
available database are non-compliance warrants and 53% of those sought

170. Id. at 23. Hennepin County did not keep track of warrants by FTA or probation violations, but
rather only the underlying criminal charge. Id.
171. See Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Ferguson Tainted by Bias, Justice Department Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2015, at A1.
172. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 10.
173. See id. at 3, 55.
174. It is unclear what portion of the warrants issued are for individuals who are not Ferguson
residents.
175. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 10.
176. See Ryley et al., supra note 161 (noting that summons fees constituted second largest source
of revenue for New York City’s criminal courts).
177. See infra section II.C.3.
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on non-compliance warrants are Black in a city that is only 20% Black.178
In Omaha, Nebraska, more than 40% of all outstanding warrants listed are
for FTAs, and 33% of those sought are Black in a city that is only 13%
Black.179 In Austin, Texas, 20% of those sought for outstanding noncompliance warrants are Black in a city that is only 7% Black.180 As is
true for virtually all large American cities,181 all three of these cities are
residentially segregated by race and class.182 This likely means that the
geographic distribution of outstanding warrants will skew towards the
neighborhoods in which poor Black residents are concentrated.
Even when specific warrant data are unavailable, one can safely
conclude that minorities are overrepresented amongst those with
outstanding warrants whenever enforcement is focused on minority
communities, as it frequently is.183 New York City’s broken windows
policing provides a compelling example. It expressly and aggressively
targeted low-income minority neighborhoods for low-level police
enforcement.184 High-volume street stops and citations were important

178. Virginia Beach maintains a publicly available database of outstanding warrants. See About
ePRO, CITY OF VA. BEACH, https://eprodmz.vbgov.com/MainUI/Home/HomeDefault.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HQ9Z-TX2M]. Data were retrieved from this database between December 8, 2017
and December 13, 2017 and placed into an Excel spreadsheet. Individuals with multiple outstanding
warrants were identified and excluded in order to reflect the number of unique individuals for whom
there was at least one outstanding warrant. Excel spreadsheets are on file with author. Warrants
characterized as “CAPIAS” were used as a proxy for non-compliance warrants.
179. Omaha maintains a publicly available database of outstanding warrants. See Warrants,
OMAHA POLICE DEP’T, http://police.cityofomaha.org/warrants?searchterm=A [https://perma.cc/U3
4Q-SY5D]. For a description of how data was collected and sorted, see supra note 178.
180. Austin maintains a publicly available database of outstanding warrants. See Austin Police
Dep’t, Court Services Unit, AUSTIN TEXAS, http://www.austintexas.gov/department/court-servicesunit [https://perma.cc/4RAL-JT3G]. The database lists outstanding warrants issued by the Municipal
Court, which has jurisdiction over misdemeanors, and the Austin Community Court, which is a
problem-solving court. All of the outstanding warrants listed are for cases in which a bond amount
was set, suggesting that they are all non-compliance warrants. No publicly available information was
discovered regarding investigatory warrants; thus no conclusion could be reached regarding the ratio
of non-compliance warrants in relation to total warrants. For description of how data was collected
and sorted, see supra note 178.
181. See SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
OF FAMILIES BY INCOME 1970–2009, at 14 & fig.2 (2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity
/Data/Report/report111111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TGL-EYF8] (describing increasing income
segregation for minority groups in a large distribution of American cities).
182. Brown University’s Diversity and Disparities website includes sortable lists of American
cities by income and race segregation. Diversity and Disparities, SPATIAL STRUCTURES SOC. SCI.,
BROWN U., https://s4.d.brown.edu/projects/diversity/Data/data.htm [https://perma.cc/C2LN-KMF9].
183. See infra section II.C.3.
184. Nirej Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1208–10
(2011).
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parts of this policing strategy.185 The vast majority of those who received
violations were minorities.186 Similarly, the DOJ noted that in Ferguson,
a disproportionately high proportion of citations, arrests, and vehicle stops
in Ferguson were of minorities.187 Accordingly, in both settings, the vast
majority of FTAs generated by these citations would inevitably be for
minorities as well.
Outstanding non-compliance warrants’ abundance further suggests that
there will be a substantial number of arrests based upon such warrants. In
New York City, for example, aggressive warrant enforcement was an
express part of the broken windows policing strategy.188 A 2004 study of
suburban Washington, D.C. and Minneapolis counties suggested that
roughly half and quarter of all arrests in each respective jurisdiction were
based upon a warrant.189 In her Strieff dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted
data from New Orleans suggesting that one third of arrests were based
upon “traffic or misdemeanor warrants,” most of which were presumably
of the non-compliance variety.190 One would expect demographic
disparities reflected in outstanding warrants to track through to the
demographic profile of those arrested. The DOJ noted that the limited data
available for Ferguson suggested just such a pattern in warrant-based
arrests.191 Without concrete demographic data though, these conclusions
are informed conjecture.192
Greater data collection regarding warrant issuance and enforcement is
urgently needed. But we can be confident that non-compliance warrants

185. See Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html [https://perma.cc/W9WL-DZ9X].
186. See id.; Sarah Ryley, supra note 161 (“Roughly 81% of 7.3 million people hit with violations
between 2001 and 2013 were black and Hispanic . . . .”); Schwirtz, supra note 166 (comparing
summons issued for riding bicycle on the sidewalk in middle-class White neighborhood versus lowerincome, Black neighborhood).
187. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4.
188. See Norimitsu Onishi, Police Announce Crackdown on Quality-of-Life Offenses, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/13/nyregion/police-announce-crackdown-onquality-of-life-offenses.html [https://perma.cc/3R5E-WBTK].
189. See Guynes & Wolff, supra note 156, at 25, 27 (analyzing Montgomery County and Hennepin
County). The reports do not specify what portion of these arrests were based on non-compliance type
warrants.
190. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
191. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 65.
192. See Radical Washentaw, Why Are Black People in Ypsilanti Disproportionately Arrested on
Bench Warrants, RAW (Jan. 14, 2016), https://radicalwashtenaw.org/2016/01/14/why-are-blackpeople-in-ypsilanti-disproportionately-arrested-on-bench-warrants/ [https://perma.cc/22BE-VTTB]
(noting high numbers of FTA arrests of Black men, but lack of data regarding demographic profile of
those for whom warrants issued).
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are prevalent and, in many jurisdictions, demographically and
geographically concentrated. This allows us to raise deeper questions
about the incentives these warrants create.
C.

Warrants, Discretion, and Disparity

The surfeit of outstanding bench warrants, coupled with the absence of
a remedy for unconstitutional seizures, generates three related sets of
harms. First, it creates incentives for police officers to engage in
unconstitutional stops. Second, these warrants amplify police discretion,
raising the practical dangers of opacity and arbitrariness. Finally, police
likely use that discretionary authority in a manner that increases race and
class disparities in the criminal justice system. This occurs through arrest
feedback loops. Put simply, arrests beget warrants and warrants beget
arrests. Urban ethnography has begun to illustrate the extent to which
outstanding warrants structure the social reality of poor, young men of
color. In extreme cases, these warrants can even have tragic
consequences, as recently suggested by the Walter Scott shooting in South
Carolina.193
1.

Unconstitutional Seizures

The sheer numbers of outstanding warrants and their geographic
concentration create powerful incentives for police to engage in
unconstitutional, suspicionless seizures.194 A defendant cannot rely on the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary remedy if a warrant was discovered in
the course of an unconstitutional seizure. This incentive structure was
established long before the Court decided Utah v. Strieff. In Strieff the
Court, over fierce dissents, turned a blind eye to that incentive structure,
ratifying unconstitutional police practices.195 Justice Sotomayor wrote a
powerful rebuke to the majority,196 but even she failed to acknowledge the

193. Walter Scott was shot in North Charleston, South Carolina after he ran from a police officer
who had stopped him for a minor traffic infraction. Scott’s family members speculated that he ran for
fear of arrest on a warrant stemming from outstanding child support. See Frances Robles & Shaila
Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-job-repeat.html
[https://perma.cc/4XDE-65FP].
194. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that many unlawful police stops in
Ferguson, Missouri “appear to have been driven, in part, by an officer’s desire to check whether the
subject had a municipal arrest warrant pending”).
195. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
196. See id.
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full dimensions of the constitutional problems that outstanding warrants
can create.
In theory, the police may not randomly stop people for warrant checks.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits stops without individualized
suspicion197—meaning reasonable suspicion that an individual has or is
about to commit an offense.198 Officers may constitutionally conduct a
warrant check in the course of an otherwise lawful stop.199 When an
officer stops an individual for the sole purpose of conducting a warrant
check, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that there is an
outstanding warrant for that person.200 But the protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment is only as vital as the remedy made available for its
violation. And in most cases, there is no meaningful remedy afforded
those who are subjected to an unconstitutional stop for a warrant check.
On its face, Strieff would appear to have been a case about
unconstitutional seizures. But Strieff never made the argument that Utah
could not hold him pursuant to the outstanding warrant. Rather, Strieff
argued that the State should not have been permitted to use the fruits of
the search incident to his unconstitutional arrest.201 Officers discovered
narcotics evidence while searching him incident to arrest and Utah sought
to convict Strieff of a new crime based on that evidence.202 Why did Strieff
not challenge the seizure directly rather than indirectly through the
evidence seized incident to the arrest?
The simple (and question-begging) answer is that exclusion is available
for unconstitutionally seized evidence but not for an unconstitutionally
seized suspect for whom there is probable cause to detain.203 As a practical
matter, the fruits of a search conducted following arrest represent the only
vehicle for challenging many arrests’ constitutionality.204 In Strieff, the
Court, like all the parties and amici, assumed this point. Had the officer
failed to find any incriminating evidence incident to arrest, Strieff would
have had no basis for seeking a remedy in criminal court.

197. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
198. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
199. See Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (suggesting that
conducting warrant check during legitimate traffic stop is constitutionally permissible).
200. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
201. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
202. Id. at 2059–60.
203. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (“Respondent is not himself a
suppressible ‘fruit,’ and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Government of the
opportunity to prove his guilt . . . .”).
204. ALLEN, supra note 65, at 500 n.18.
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The Court has stated that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a
defendant’s person.205 This idea first took shape in the nineteenth century
and was later expressed as the Frisbie-Ker doctrine.206 The historical
record prior to that is ambiguous.207 There is however, some support for
the notion that dismissal was sometimes afforded criminal defendants for
official misconduct occurring in connection with arrest.208
Frisbie-Ker holds that due process does not require a criminal court to
consider how a defendant was brought before it, but only that the
defendant receive a fair trial once there.209 Neither Frisbie nor Ker
involved law enforcement’s violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather,
in Ker, the earlier of the two cases, a federal agent unlawfully kidnapped
the defendant from Peru for criminal trial in the United States.210 Ker’s
arrest constituted a kidnapping because it was not carried out in precise
accord with the United States’s extradition agreement with Peru. The
federal agent had the “necessary papers” to obtain custody of Ker, but the
agent failed to “[present] them to any officer of the Peruvian
government.”211 Peru was not party to the litigation; nor is there mention
in the opinion of its having asserted any sovereign injury as a result of the
federal agent’s conduct. Extradition is more a matter of sovereign
prerogative than an individual right.212 That is important context for the
Court’s statement that “we do not think [a defendant] is entitled to say that
he should not be tried at all” because of “mere irregularities in the manner
in which he may be brought into . . . custody.”213 Moreover, Ker was
decided in 1886, before the advent of substantive due process concepts,
modern procedural due process, or the exclusionary rule. Sixty years later,
Frisbie invoked the same language in an interstate extradition case

205. See Crews, 445 U.S. at 474.
206. See id. (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)).
207. See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009–10) (researching pre-foundation judicial practice is challenging because
so little of it was reported).
208. See id. at 22–25. The analogy to contemporary criminal justice practice is also quite weak
given that criminal justice was not bureaucratized and constitutional violations were not thought
attributable to the government. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 621–22, 663–67 (1999).
209. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (citing Ker, 119 U.S. at 444).
210. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 442 (noting that extradition treaty between United States and Peru did not create any
positive right on the part of defendant to asylum in Peru).
213. Id. at 440.
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without any new analysis.214 All of this is to say, Frisbie-Ker provides
weak conceptual moorings for denying a remedy for unconstitutional
seizures.
Frisbie-Ker aside, granting an exclusionary style remedy for
unconstitutional seizures might seem impractical. Excluding the person
would amount to a court setting a wanted individual free but without
legally altering the individual’s wanted status. Since the constitutional
problem is with the stop, not the warrant, there would be no legal basis
for quashing it. To release a wanted defendant is to invite formalistic
contrivance. The judge would “exclude” the defendant, who would then
exit the court to confront the sheriff waiting just outside, ready to arrest
on the valid warrant.215 Perhaps clever defendants would find a way to
evade the waiting sheriff, but letting a legitimately wanted individual run
seems strange. Criminal prosecution “is not a fox hunt,” Justice Holmes
quipped.216 The Court has dealt with this by simply eliminating the
possibility of a practical remedy for an unconstitutional seizure where a
valid warrant exists.217 That too seems strange. But it is a defensible
choice if one accepts a magisterial view of warrants (or extradition). In
this sense, Frisbie-Ker returns us to Utah v. Strieff.
Both Frisbie-Ker and Strieff are based on the view that an arrest
conducted pursuant to judicial order is “ministerial.” Where a magistrate
has made the choices as to who is to be arrested or what is to be searched,
the dangers of law enforcement discretion are substantially contained. To
use the Court’s language in Strieff, an extradition order, like an arrest
warrant, is “a judicial mandate to an officer to . . . make an arrest.”218
Warrants force the police to make their case for searching/seizing in
advance of doing so.
The problem with this conception is that in cases like Evans, Herring,
and Strieff, the Court proceeds as if all warrants were cut of the same
magisterial cloth when, in fact, they are not. In the same vein, Frisbie-Ker
has been generalized to apply far more broadly than those cases’ unique
facts might have suggested.219 Generalizing in this way has allowed the
Court to overlook the extent to which some, likely most, species of
warrants generate precisely the kind of problematic enforcement
discretion that has long been the Fourth Amendment’s core concern.
214. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
215. See id.
216. See Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 13 (1916) (“But merely to be declared free in a room with
the marshal standing at the door having another warrant in his hand would be an empty form.”).
217. Cf. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 474 n.20 (1980).
218. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016).
219. See Crews, 445 U.S. at 474 (1980).
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The unconstitutional practices described here are not likely to be evenly
distributed across most jurisdictions. The greatest protection afforded any
individual’s constitutional rights flows from the fact that suspicionless
warrant checks are not efficient from an arrest-maximizer’s perspective.
But where an officer has reason to believe that a substantial number of
people likely have outstanding warrants such that the hit rate of doing
random warrant checks will be high, we should expect unconstitutional
stops to occur.220 For these reasons, aggressive warrant enforcement is not
likely to occur in neighborhoods where residents enjoy political and
economic power. But in poor neighborhoods, outstanding warrants’
prevalence combined with their geographic concentration makes the
likelihood of a “hit” higher. This point is developed next.
2.

Expanding Enforcement Discretion

Characterizing warrant enforcement as “ministerial” touts the
magisterial ideal at the cost of denying the discretion that non-compliance
warrants affirmatively generate. That non-compliance warrants take the
form of a “command” to police officers should not be taken at face
value.221 They are no more a judicial command than the criminal law is a
legislative command. Both “commands” generate pools of prospective
arrestees. Law enforcement agencies and officers enjoy considerable
discretion to select (and not select) from the pool. Scholars have long
noted and criticized the broad discretion that police enjoy to enforce (or
not enforce) criminal laws.222 Enforcement discretion raises the dangers
of arbitrariness and opacity.223 The same dangers exist with regard to
warrant enforcement.
Scholars first took note of police discretion in the mid-twentieth
century.224 The vast expanse of human conduct covered by criminal laws
makes full enforcement impossible. That means that the police inevitably
have choices to make about when to enforce those laws and when not to.
Kenneth Culp Davis, one of the early legal scholars to critically engage
the reality of police discretion, argued that these choices allowed

220. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Respondent’s Brief, supra note
156, at 5–7.
221. See supra note 130.
222. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 99, 139 (1975).
223. See id. at 99.
224. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 6–7 (1993) (summarizing early research).
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individual patrol officers to be “policy makers” for their beats.225 Davis
noted that most police manuals, where they existed at all, included nothing
about enforcement priorities.226 Taking cover under the rhetorical blanket
of “full enforcement,” police department administrators deferred to
patrolmen to decide when and against whom to enforce criminal laws.227
The early scholars were particularly troubled by officers’ decisions not to
enforce criminal laws because those choices were entirely invisible to
supervisors.228
Institutional choices are an even more significant determinant of
enforcement outcomes than individual officers’ choices. As I have argued
in previous work,229 choices with regard to which criminal laws to
enforce, how intensively to enforce them, in which locations, and with
which tactics are all policy questions within police departments’
discretion.230 Departments’ choices with regard to each of these questions
have significant distributive consequences.231 For example, using arrestintensive enforcement tactics will likely generate more arrests than using
high-visibility deterrence tactics.232 Electing to do arrest-intensive
narcotics enforcement in a low-income minority community as opposed
to a wealthier middle-class one will generate arrestees, defendants, and
convicts that are correspondingly poor.233 The DOJ’s analysis of the
Ferguson Police Department revealed a particularly insidious example of
how institutional and individual officer discretion interact to produce
unjust outcomes. The DOJ found that the Ferguson Police Department
“communicated to officers that . . . they must focus on bringing in
revenue.”234 Officers were required to meet specified citation quotas each
month.235 The institutional emphasis on revenue generation led officers to
engage in aggressive municipal and traffic code enforcement, issuing
225.
226.
227.
228.

DAVIS, supra note 222, at 99, 139.
Id. at 33–37, 52.
Id. at 52 (“[The] only open enforcement policy is one of full enforcement.”).
Wayne R. LaFave, Police Rule-Making and the Fourth Amendment, in DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 211, 215 (Lloyd
E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993) (characterizing early scholars’ concerns). Discretion
increases in inverse relation to the seriousness of the relevant crime: officers can ignore traffic
offenses as they like, but not homicides.
229. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1172.
230. Id. at 1186–91.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1206.
233. Id. at 1199–2000.
234. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
235. Id. at 12 (twenty-eight tickets per month).
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citations for minor misconduct236—for example, traffic and pedestrian
violations, disturbing the peace, and even failing to maintain one’s yard—
that were punished with unusually high fines.237
Non-compliance warrants suggest that courts are enmeshed in a
complex ecosystem in which they sometimes restrain and at other times
affirmatively generate police enforcement discretion. Ferguson provides
a disturbing example of the latter. The court, like the police, played a
central role in generating revenue for the city. To that end, it aggressively
levied fees and fines against those charged with minor municipal
infractions, made it procedurally difficult to contest those infractions, and
wantonly issued non-compliance warrants for failures to appear.238 The
warrants also carried fees payable to the municipality that were separate
and apart from those for the underlying infraction.239
Just because non-compliance warrants are formally expressed as a
“command” to police does not mean police understand them as such. The
San Francisco Police Department, for example, permits its officers to
forgo arrest in cases where an individual with an outstanding traffic
warrant claims to have paid it.240 Officers are supposed to obtain
supervisor approval first,241 but how that would be enforced is unclear.
Just as with criminal law violations, outstanding warrants afford
individual officers analogous “policy making” authority to that Davis
wrote about in the 1970s.242 Officers’ acts of leniency in this context are
no more visible to supervisors or the public than forgone opportunities to
enforce criminal laws. One might imagine an officer directing a
sympathetic suspect to “take care” of an unpaid traffic ticket rather than
arresting the suspect on an outstanding warrant. That act of leniency is
qualitatively no different than the officer letting a speeder go “with a
warning” in the first instance. Such acts of leniency are sometimes
publicly remarked upon, usually as laudatory examples of officers’
magnanimity.243 But few of those examples are likely brought to public
light.

236. Id. at 4.
237. Id. at 52.
238. Id. at 42, 55.
239. Id.
240. S.F., Cal., Police Dep’t Gen. Order 6.18 II.A.1.b (July 27, 1994), https://sanfranciscopolice.
org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/14754-DGO6.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9LM-JK3C].
241. Id.
242. DAVIS, supra note 222, at 99, 139.
243. See, e.g., Kate Irby, The Officer Could Have Taken Him to Jail, but Took Him to His Sister’s
Funeral Instead, STAR-TELEGRAM (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/nationworld/national/article104390156.html [https://perma.cc/GF3L-AZEY].
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As with criminal laws, departmental policy-making discretion in
warrant enforcement has broader and deeper implications than any
individual officers’ discretionary choices. Nor are departments
particularly transparent about these choices, let alone their implications.
As a threshold matter, it is a department’s willingness to invest in
technological infrastructure and personnel that enables the possibility of
remote warrant checks and enforcement at all. For officers to routinely
conduct warrant checks, they must be able to remotely access a complete
and well-organized store of information regarding outstanding warrants.
Without both communication and data-storage technology, ascertaining
whether a bench warrant exists for a person in the field would be time and
resource-prohibitive. The Los Angeles Police Department, often at the
forefront of technological innovation amongst large American police
departments, embraced high-tech communication and data storage
beginning in the 1950s.244 By the 1970s, warrant checks were a routine
feature of traffic stops in at least some jurisdictions.245 Today, there are
vast federal, state, and local databases cataloging information regarding
outstanding warrants, the nature of the underlying offense, identifying
information regarding the individual sought, and other information.246
Officers in the field can often readily access those databases, particularly
when their department has invested in patrol-vehicle computers.247
Police departments also enjoy discretion with regard to populating
federal, state, and local databases,248 signaling to its officers and other
departments how seriously it takes any particular warrant. Whether they
do so or not turns on discretionary use of personnel resources. Entering
warrant data into databases is labor intensive, and there is no mechanism
for ensuring which, if any, warrants an agency has entered.249 It is likely
that many outstanding warrants are not entered in any database. For those

244. See MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 251 (Mike Davis & Michael Sprinkler eds., 1990); LeRoy
McCabe & Leonard Farr, An Information System for Law Enforcement, 1966 AM. FED. INFO.
PROCESSING SOC. 513, 515–18 (describing system design study for Los Angeles Police Department
information system).
245. See John A. Webster, Police Task and Time Study, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 94, 99 (1970) (noting possibility of remote warrant check during traffic stop).
246. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Twenty-One
Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Respondent at 11–12, Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __,
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373).
247. See id.
248. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 157, tbl.5a.
249. See Lawrence Budd, Many Wanted Felons Go Free, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Sept. 8, 2012,
12:00 AM), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime--law/many-wanted-felons-free/3A7pWp
qam4WDWqzs3OHugP/ [https://perma.cc/NHJ4-E9UT].
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that are entered, law enforcement agencies are able to specify a “pick-up
radius”—the geographic scope within which the agency will expend
resources on collecting a wanted person.250 The pick-up radius reflects
how seriously a department takes a particular category of warrants.251
Some relatively minor offenses may have a county-only pick-up radius
while serious offense may have a nationwide pick-up radius.252 There
would be a legal basis for arresting someone on a warrant who was outside
the pick-up area specified by the warrant-issuing jurisdiction, but the
arresting agency would have to pay for transport. That is a discretionary
act that an arresting agency is unlikely to undertake.
As with the enforcement of substantive criminal laws, police
departments enjoy considerable discretion with regard to warrant
enforcement. Departmental choices regarding whether, where, and how
criminal laws are to be enforced determine the volume and demographic
profile of arrestees.253 The same holds true for warrant enforcement. Once
the infrastructure is in place to allow for quick warrant checks from the
field, departmental choices will determine how harshly or leniently
individual officers will use warrant checks as an enforcement tactic. A
department could very well decide not to make arrests for certain
categories of warrants at all.254 The Minneapolis Police Department
recently announced just such a policy decision.255 It has elected not to
make arrests for outstanding warrants where the underlying offenses are
minor—like traffic infractions.256 The choice was not one in favor of
leniency for its own sake, but rather to make resources available for more
serious crime control exigencies.257 This is the same rationale that a
department might offer for forgoing arrests of low-level substantive
criminal law offenses, like possession of small quantities of marijuana.

250. See Warrant Computer Entries, Prisoner Return and Extradition, in CINCINNATI POLICE
DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE MANUAL 12.727 (2010), https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/depart
ment-references/police-department-procedure-manual/ [https://perma.cc/X5GR-ZHQK].
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1186–90.
254. See Procedure 503 – Obtaining and Executing Arrest Warrants, in SAN ANTONIO POLICE
DEPARTMENT GENERAL MANUAL 503.05(B) (2014), https://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/SA
PD/GeneralManual/503ObtainingandExecutingArrestWarrants(10-03-14).pdf [https://perma.cc/9PB
8-3G5N] (no arrest permitted for out-of-state misdemeanor warrant).
255. Lou Raguse, MPD Not Arresting for Misdemeanor Bench Warrants, KARE 11 (July 20, 2016,
11:55 PM), http://www.kare11.com/news/mpd-not-arresting-for-misdemeanor-bench-warrants/2782
03637 [https://perma.cc/VS75-3CVK].
256. Id.
257. Id.
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A police department could just as easily exercise its warrant
enforcement discretion harshly. For example, as described in the
introduction, warrant enforcement has been a centerpiece of high-profile
Detroit Police Department raids.258 While the raids were supposed to
target at-large felons, most of the arrests were of individuals with
outstanding traffic warrants.259 Quality-of-life policing in New York City
presents a more far-ranging and systematic example. Warrant
enforcement has featured prominently in the New York City Police
Department’s quality-of-life campaign.260 As detailed at length by others,
quality-of-life policing entailed aggressive policing against minor, socalled broken windows crimes on the premise that doing so would create
the impression of “order” and thereby deter more serious crimes.261 As
part of the initiative, the New York Police Department incentivized patrol
officers to issue more citations and make more arrests for a range of
previously tolerated misconduct like drinking in public, aggressive
panhandling, obstructing public sidewalks, and so on.262 Concomitantly,
the department devoted resources to developing the infrastructure
required for tracking the warrants issued against those who had FTAs for
quality-of-life crimes.263 This was, in turn, supposed to enable officers in
the field to more readily make arrests on such warrants.264 In other words,
New York Police Department policy makers conceived of warrant
enforcement and criminal law enforcement as coterminous features of the
same harsh, arrest-intensive strategy for creating “order” on New York’s
streets.
The order maintenance example in New York City suggests the extent
to which enforcement discretion generated by warrants and substantive
criminal law can amplify one another. The most acute danger with
discretionary authority is that it will be systematically exercised to the
disadvantage of marginal groups. The next section demonstrates why
warrants are more than just another law enforcement practice that
incrementally contributes to criminal justice’s disproportionate impact on
the poor and minorities.
258. Ryan Felton, Operation: Restore Public Relations, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/operation-restore-public-relations/Content?oid=2334953
[https://perma.cc/E2UR-Q34Y].
259. Id.
260. See Onishi, supra note 188.
261. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1203–06.
262. See Benjamin Weiser, New York City to Pay up to $75 Million over Dismissed Summonses,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/nyregion/new-york-city-agreesto-settlement-over-summonses-that-were-dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/QHX9-ZJRH].
263. See Onishi, supra note 188.
264. See id.
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Class, Race, and Arrest Feedback

Aggressive warrant enforcement will create arrest feedback loops that
amplify the demographic consequences of aggressive policing in poor,
minority communities. Arrests for criminal law violations, noncompliance warrants, and warrant enforcement are recursive, generating
mutually reinforcing demographic and geographic effects over time.
Arrests for substantive criminal law violations generate non-compliance
warrants in the form of FTAs, alleged probation violations, and so on.
Those warrants will, in turn, generate arrests. But they will also help
identify new substantive criminal law violations as was true in Strieff. The
outstanding warrant in that case allowed the officer to arrest Strieff and
search him incident to arrest, revealing narcotics, which generated a new
criminal law offense.265 A new cycle of non-compliance warrants and
arrests could then ensue. Police agencies are likely to rely upon the
demographic profile generated by this feedback loop to channel arrestintensive policing resources. Doing so contributes to the feedback and
provides even greater rationale to continue the practices that sustain it.
In any given jurisdiction that has a substantial poor population, criminal
courts are likely to issue disproportionately greater numbers of noncompliance warrants for poor defendants. In many of America’s largest
jurisdictions, minorities inordinately constitute the ranks of the poor and
the non-compliance warrants issued will reflect that demographic fact.266
This will be true even if one assumes that there is proportionality in the
number of well-to-do and poor defendants charged with criminal law
violations and infractions at any given time—and as discussed in detail
later on, that is an exceptionally unrealistic assumption. The poor are less
likely to comply with the kinds of conditions that trigger warrants,
particularly those that require payment. Even making appearances in court
is more difficult for the poor, who tend to have marginal employment that
affords little flexibility to take time off work.267 This makes appearing for
court dates more difficult than for those who have more stable
employment.268 Once a warrant has issued, those with unstable

265. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016).
266. See Elizabeth Kneebone & Richard V. Reeves, The Intersection of Race, Place, and
Multidimensional Poverty, BROOKINGS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/theintersection-of-race-place-and-multidimensional-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/JAM5-AG49].
267. See, e.g., DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 48.
268. See id.
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employment stand a greater risk of losing their jobs if incarcerated, even
for relatively short periods of time.269
The fear of incarceration may, ironically, lead the poor to be less likely
to deal with outstanding warrants.270 This will be most true for noncompliance warrants that are for failures to pay.271 Traffic and low-level
criminal offenses are typically punished with fines. Similarly, paying fees
and fines is often a condition of probation.272 Other probation conditions,
such as complying with treatment and counseling obligations, also may
require making payment. And of course, warrants for failing to pay child
support are almost exclusively leveled against poor men.273 When
financial obligations like these go unpaid—or one fails to appear for a
court hearing involving such a financial obligation—a bench warrant will
often issue.274 Despite the constitutional requirement that courts level no
greater fee or fine than a defendant can actually pay, poor violators may
be afraid to appear in court because they fear being jailed for their inability
to comply.275
Court rules and processes also can play a significant role in ensuring
that the poor are more likely to be warranted than those with means. These
processes often ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable defendants
are unable to comply with court-ordered conditions, including the
obligation to appear for court proceedings. The DOJ’s Ferguson report
details a stark example.276 The court liberally issued warrants for
defendants charged with minor crime and citations, doing so at a
disproportionately high rate for minority defendants.277 The court required
in-person appearances for most municipal offenses. That requirement
269. See Alice Goffman, On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto, 74 AM. SOC. REV.
339, 354 (2009).
270. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 47–49 (documenting belief amongst those
unable to pay fine that appearing in court will result in immediate arrest); Daniel M. Flannery & Jeff
M. Kretschmar, Fugitive Safe Surrender, 11 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 437, 451 (2012).
271. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 47–49.
272. See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism,
104 GEO. L.J. 291, 314 (2016).
273. See Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, supra note 137, at 193–96.
274. In theory, it is unconstitutional to jail a defendant for failing to pay a fee or fine that she is too
poor to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S 660 (1985). But, when the issue is raised at all, the “ability
to pay” is a question of fact that judges have discretion to decide. In contexts like child support, judges
have been known to impose financial obligations based upon fanciful projections of the potential
earnings that a low-skilled, poor father might earn. See Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, supra note 137,
at 196.
275. See Flannery & Kretschmar, supra note 270, at 451.
276. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19.
277. See id. at 68.
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increased the likelihood that defendants would fail to appear—particularly
those who worried about paying the high fines and those with inflexible
work schedules. Compounding the appearance requirement, the DOJ
found that the court did not provide information to defendants regarding
their rights, the charges against them, or even the correct date or time of
their hearing.278 Ironically, full payment was required as a precondition
for quashing any warrant, however egregiously unlawful its issuance.279
Ferguson may be an extreme example, but it is likely different from
other jurisdictions in quantity, not kind. Fees and fines are heaped upon
poor defendants in many jurisdictions with similar consequences to those
observed in Ferguson.280 Many jurisdictions, for example, rely upon
private contractors to provide probation services for misdemeanors and
traffic violations.281 The private probation companies generate revenue by
charging probationers a supervisory fee.282 Company employees are, in
turn, rewarded for maximizing revenue.283 This leads to aggressive use of
revocation and the concomitant issuing of non-compliance warrants.284
This “aggressive collection agency” approach to collecting fines and fees
impacts poor defendants most severely.285
The discussion thus far has assumed that police arrest the poor and the
privileged proportionally for new criminal law and traffic violations. That,
of course, is completely untrue. Police enforcement is usually directed
more aggressively against poor and minority communities.286 At any
given time, in most large urban jurisdictions in the United States, the
majority of defendants who are forced into the criminal justice machinery
278. Id. at 51–52.
279. See id. at 47.
280. See Profiting from Probation: America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offend
er-funded-probation-industry [https://perma.cc/J59A-APTY] (describing fees imposed by private
probation companies in Georgia) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
281. See Sarah Doisca Bellacicco, Safe Haven No Longer: The Role of Georgia Courts and Private
Probation Companies in Sustaining a De Facto Debtors’ Prison System, 48 GA. L. REV. 227, 245
(2014).
282. See id.
283. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 280, at 51.
284. S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROFITING FROM THE POOR: A REPORT ON PREDATORY
PROBATION COMPANIES IN GEORGIA 8 (2008) [hereinafter S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS]; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 280, at 51 (124,788 warrants issued in 2012 in Georgia for
individuals on private probation). Some probation companies allow supervisors, who are rewarded
for generating revenue, to shed non-paying probationers from their caseload as an incentive. Id.
285. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 52–54; S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 284, at 8.
286. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1199–200.
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are low-income minorities.287 Calls for police service may be higher in
low-income communities than other communities. The police might also
elect to use aggressive arrest and citation-intensive enforcement tactics in
poor neighborhoods as part of a broken windows campaign as occurred in
New York City or narcotics suppression as has occurred in any number of
cities.288 A city like Ferguson, motivated by revenue incentives, might
focus police resources in poor neighborhoods because there are more
readily visible code violations that can be ticketed there or because
residents are less likely to challenge the citations.289 Similar logic might
impel a highway patrol division to target a crime like license tag renewal
violation, which is more frequently committed by low-income
motorists.290
Because there are proportionally more “minority inputs” into the
criminal justice machinery for new criminal law and traffic violations, that
will contribute to their proportionally greater failures to appear, failures
to pay, and failures to comply with probation conditions.291 Noncompliance warrants are a by-product of aggressive criminal law
enforcement. But substantive criminal law violations are also a by-product
of aggressive warrant enforcement. An outstanding non-compliance
warrant not only creates a basis for making an arrest but is a vehicle for
identifying new criminal law violations. Once police make an arrest
pursuant to an outstanding warrant, the Fourth Amendment permits a
search incident to arrest, which will sometimes yield evidence of a new
crime; in Strieff, it was narcotics evidence.292 The Supreme Court held that
such evidence is admissible in a new criminal case, even if the stop that
allowed for discovery of the outstanding warrant was unconstitutional.293

287. See, e.g., DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 65–66 (minorities arrested at higher rate
for violations than Whites).
288. See supra notes 258–64 and discussion; Adrienne L. Meiring, Walking the Constitutional
Beat: Fourth Amendment Implications of Police Use of Saturation Patrols and Roadblocks, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 497, 500 (1993) (describing twined use of warrant checks and stop and frisk as part of
“saturation patrol” strategy in various cities).
289. See supra notes 258–64 and discussion.
290. Cf. Sharon LaFreniere & Andrew Lehern, Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stopsdriving-black.html [https://perma.cc/A9HL-C3DA] (discussing racial disparity in traffic stops in
North Carolina).
291. Cf. John S. Goldkamp & E. Vîlcicã, Targeted Enforcement and Adverse System Side Effects:
The Generation of Fugitives in Philadelphia, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 371, 374 (2008).
292. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016).
293. Id.

Sekhon – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete)

2018]

DANGEROUS WARRANTS

6/6/2018 9:38 PM

1007

This sort of dynamic, however, has the potential to shape police
enforcement policy more broadly.
For any jurisdiction that has a substantial poor minority population,
arrest feedback may create what Bernard Harcourt has called a “ratchet
effect.”294 A ratchet effect occurs when police use the demographic profile
of an incarcerated population to predict the identities of future offenders
and direct enforcement resources accordingly.295 In the context of warrant
enforcement, police might use demographic and geographic information
on the prevalence of outstanding warrants—or their perceptions of
demographic and geographic prevalence—to structure how enforcement
resources are distributed. More outstanding warrants for minority suspects
will support more arrest-intensive policing in minority neighborhoods. In
turn, that will generate more arrests for substantive criminal law violations
and more warrants. Over time, this will lead to an increasingly
concentrated minority demographic in a jurisdiction’s criminal justice
machinery. Judges are probably less likely to set affordable bail for those
defendants who have, or have had, a warrant for an FTA. In-custody
defendants are more likely to plead guilty than out-of-custody defendants.
These dynamics are likely to fuel perceptions among the police of
disproportionate minority criminality. That is to say that compliance
warrants’ enforcement effects will generate their own, self-supporting
demographic rationale.
Arrest feedback helps explain why outstanding warrants figure
prominently in the experience of young men of color in America’s cities.
Although that experience is not the subject of sustained sociological
treatment, recent urban ethnography suggests that just the perception of
having an outstanding warrant constrains a person’s quotidian life
choices, like applying for a job, to monumental ones, like being present
for the birth of a child.296 As discussed, an outstanding warrant functions
as a “red flag,”297 leaving many in poor minority communities to navigate
life with the belief that the State’s punitive eye is trained upon them. They
may not even be aware of the warrant’s precise nature.298 For the young
men of color who constitute America’s urban underclass, the perception
of having “caught a warrant” amplifies the sense of vulnerability to arrest
294. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE 145 (2005).
295. Id. at 152–54.
296. See Goffman, supra note 269, at 343–45, 351–52, 354.
297. See supra notes 147–48 and discussion.
298. See Flannery & Kretschmar, supra note 270, at 449 (finding that one in three warrant study
participants was unaware of the nature of outstanding warrant).
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and incarceration. That sense leads many to curtail encounters not just
with the police, but with public actors who are thought to have a
connection to the police like hospitals and courts.299 That is to live a
cramped existence at best. It may even lead to deadly consequences if, for
example, the belief that one has an outstanding warrant prompts someone
to run from a police officer who then shoots.300
III. REGULATING NON-COMPLIANCE WARRANTS
Section II demonstrated that non-compliance warrants generate both
constitutional and extra-constitutional harms. As a preliminary matter,
federal, state, and local governments should systematically collect data on
the number of outstanding warrants, the bases for those warrants, the
number of arrests that are warrant-based, and the demographic profile of
the individuals sought and arrested. As is true in other areas of criminal
justice,301 the paucity of data makes it difficult to evaluate judicial and
police practices, let alone reform them. The analysis in Part II also
counsels in favor of substantive reform at the federal, state, and local
levels.
First, the Supreme Court should create a meaningful remedy for the
constitutional harms non-compliance warrants encourage. This requires
substantial revision of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: mainly, it
demands that some version of an exclusionary remedy be available for
wrongfully seized persons. Such dramatic reworking of doctrine is not
imminent. Thankfully, there is considerable room for state and local
reform. Local courts and police generate and enforce the overwhelming
majority of outstanding non-compliance warrants. Accordingly, those
agencies are well positioned to ameliorate the problems created by noncompliance warrants.
A.

Excluding the Person

The Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff incorrectly for the reasons
identified by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.302 But section II.B.1
demonstrated that Strieff only marginally contributes to the already
powerful incentives that police have to conduct unconstitutional warrant
299. See Goffman, supra note 269, at 343–45, 351–52, 354.
300. See supra note 193.
301. See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical Assessment of Police Shootings, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 189, 193 (2016) [hereinafter Sekhon, Blue on Black] (noting paucity of data regarding
police shootings).
302. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–74 (2016).
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checks. Excluding evidence seized incident to arrest would not likely alter
those incentives so profoundly. If police are to be deterred from carrying
out unconstitutional warrant checks, defendants must have an immediate
remedy in their criminal case for the unconstitutional seizure.303
The Court should provide some form of the exclusionary remedy for
unconstitutional seizures like that which occurred in Strieff. The remedy
should not depend upon whether police happen to discover additional
evidence of wrongdoing following a search incident to arrest. In many
cases, this would mean releasing defendants from custody and allowing
them to run notwithstanding valid warrants for their arrest.
Frisbie-Ker is the greatest obstacle to making some version of the
exclusionary remedy available to those subject to unconstitutional warrant
checks. Frisbie-Ker forbids a court from dismissing an indictment based
on law enforcement having unlawfully obtained the defendant’s
presence.304 Frisbie-Ker, which developed in the context of extradition
cases, makes sense where the magisterial ideal is borne out, whether in
the context of extradition or warrants. Where the State has gone to the
trouble of obtaining judicial approval for an enforcement action and
commits a procedural error in its execution, the defendant should not
receive the windfall of dismissal. Frisbie-Ker rejected just such a
“sporting theory” of criminal procedure. But the rejection is profoundly
out of tune with the account of non-compliance warrants provided in this
Article.
Non-compliance warrants and their enforcement reflect the extent to
which criminal justice actually has become sport. When Justice Holmes
quipped that criminal enforcement is not a “fox hunt,”305 he could not have
anticipated that a government would reward police, prosecutors, and
judges for racking up high scores in a relentless competition to produce
revenue.306 In Ferguson, issuing non-compliance warrants was just a
strategic move in the broader revenue scheme. The warrants bore no
relation to criminal prosecution’s traditional ends: punishing or deterring
crime. Enforcing the warrants amounted to playing the odds in
neighborhoods where the “hit rate” is likely to be high.307 There were no
“points” to be had by upholding the Constitution.308
303. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (right to be free of unconstitutional search is an
“empty promise” without exclusionary remedy).
304. See supra section II.C.1.
305. See supra note 216 and accompanying discussion.
306. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 10 (noting that police officers were more
concerned with generating revenue than public safety or welfare).
307. See supra section II.C.3.
308. See supra section II.C.1.

Sekhon – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete)

1010

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/6/2018 9:38 PM

[Vol. 93:967

Denying an exclusionary remedy to unconstitutionally seized
defendants is not to abjure a sporting theory of criminal procedure, but
rather to embrace one whose rules are stacked against defendants. Where
a defendant is unconstitutionally stopped and arrested on an outstanding
warrant for a minor traffic violation, being released is no windfall. Doing
so simply denies the state the ill-gotten gains of its unconstitutional
conduct. This is entirely consistent with the traditional understanding of
how the exclusionary rule is supposed to deter police officers from
engaging in unconstitutional misconduct.309 But extending the
exclusionary remedy to unconstitutional seizures in this way would raise
procedural difficulties separate and apart from Frisbie-Ker.
First, courts would have to construct a typology of warrants that
distinguishes between those which could be the basis for exclusion and
those which could not. An unconstitutional seizure should, in other words,
compel release in some cases, but not others.310 As suggested by the
example above, the case for release is strongest with regard to noncompliance warrants for outstanding traffic infractions.311 In these cases,
courts would have to develop rules specifying some amount of time
during which the police would be barred from re-serving the warrant. This
would prevent the exclusionary remedy from collapsing into risible
formalism: a judge sets a defendant free just for the few moments it takes
the sheriff to re-arrest based on the valid warrant.312
In contrast to traffic infractions are serious felonies involving harm to
others. The logic of Frisbie-Ker is most convincing in cases where an
investigatory warrant is outstanding in connection with a serious case like
this. A sporting theory of criminal procedure is least satisfactory in this
context. Letting a suspected murderer free for an unconstitutional warrant
check defies any ordinary conception of justice. The cost-benefit analysis
309. See Stuntz, supra note 74, at 895–96.
310. This will not sit comfortably with the Court’s insistence that the Fourth Amendment is transsubstantive and applies in exactly the same way regardless of the underlying criminal offense at issue.
William Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 842, 870 (2001). The simple rejoinder is that the proposal here does not implicate substantive
Fourth Amendment principles, but only whether the exclusionary rule is available—an inquiry that
requires cost-benefit analysis. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2051, 2061 (2016) (citing
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
311. In traffic cases and other comparably minor criminal cases, quashing the warrant and
dismissing the underlying case would seem fair. Such a remedy would be appropriate if the
jurisdiction considering exclusion were the very one that had issued the warrant. But that would not
always be the case. If an individual were unconstitutionally seized by the police in a jurisdiction other
than that which issued the warrant, the court considering exclusion would not have authority to quash
the outstanding warrant or dismiss the underlying case.
312. See Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 13 (1916).
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that exclusionary rule jurisprudence calls for313 clearly would not weigh
in favor of release in such a case. There is, of course, a vast swath of cases
between the traffic FTA and the wanted murder suspect. Courts would
have to decide how to treat warrants stemming from these intermediate
cases over time, and principles would accordingly develop.
Second, there would have to be an opportunity to litigate the Fourth
Amendment violation soon after arrest. Suppression is typically litigated
in advance of trial. But for those who are unconstitutionally seized and
subsequently held on an outstanding warrant, trial may be too late for
exclusion to be useful. Defendants should have an opportunity to litigate
exclusion in the immediate wake of arrest. While someone held pursuant
to a warrant is not constitutionally entitled to a Gerstein hearing,314 some
functional equivalent is necessary in order to guarantee that exclusion is
of practical use. This, however, raises a third and less tractable problem.
The evidentiary contest over the stop’s constitutionality will pit officer
testimony against the defendant’s testimony, and officers are likely to
have the upper hand.315 Officers are permitted to approach citizens and
ask them to consensually share identifying information, which would
provide a sufficient basis for a lawful warrant check.316 In the absence of
consent, officers are permitted to seize an individual and conduct a brief
investigative interview if there is “reasonable suspicion” to think that the
individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. 317 Officers can
obtain identifying information as part of such an interview.318 Depending
on the neighborhood, a “bulge [at the] waistband,” “‘furtive’ movements,”
or holding eye contact may be sufficient to constitute “reasonable
suspicion.”319 It is easy for an officer to manufacture such facts following
what, in fact, was an unconstitutional stop. This, of course, is a species of
“testilying.”320 Whenever resolution of Fourth Amendment questions
turns on a contested issue of fact regarding the basis for the stop, officers
will have opportunity for strategic re-telling of the facts. And defendants,
313. See id.
314. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1974).
315. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 COLO. L.
REV. 1037, 1041–45 (1996).
316. See Michael Kimberly, Discovering Arrest Warrants: Intervening Police Conduct and
Foreseeability, 118 YALE L.J. 177, 179 (2008) (describing practice).
317. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)).
318. See Hiibel v. Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004) (holding Fourth Amendment permits state
to compel suspect to disclose name in a lawful Terry stop).
319. See Sekhon, Blue on Black, supra note 301, at 198 (describing incident reports prepared by
Chicago police).
320. See Slobogin, supra note 315, at 1041–45.
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particularly if it is just their word, are left in the awkward and untenable
position of persuading judges that officers lied on the stand. This
evidentiary problem is endemic in Fourth Amendment litigation and
should not prevent the creation of a remedy for unconstitutional seizures.
Even if making exclusion available for seizures is largely symbolic,
that symbolism is superior to the status quo, where there is no remedy at
all. The absence of a remedy signals to police agencies and officers that
the practice is permissible.321 Symbolically underscoring the
impermissibility of unconstitutional conduct is important, even if not
actionable in every case of a violation. And, of course, there will be some
cases in which, for whatever reason, it is factually clear that police did
conduct an unconstitutional stop before discovering a valid noncompliance warrant. Strieff is an example of just such a case. It is unclear
why there should not be a remedy in such cases, just as there is when
physical evidence is unconstitutionally discovered or seized. The Court
itself elliptically recognizes the awkwardness of this disjuncture in Strieff.
In Strieff, the Court indicated that it might be appropriate for courts to
exclude physical evidence seized incident to arrest if a defendant can show
that police regularly and systematically make unconstitutional seizures in
order to do warrant checks.322 Practically speaking, it will be difficult for
most criminal defendants to marshal the evidence required to successfully
demonstrate a pattern and practice of unconstitutional policing. I have
argued elsewhere that public defenders in particular should take up the
Court’s challenge, beginning by systematically tracking clients’ reports of
police misconduct.323 In the meantime, however, there is little leverage for
challenging unconstitutional seizures where a valid warrant is discovered.
Thankfully, the possibility of meaningful local reform does not turn on
constitutional principles.
B.

Embracing the Magisterial Ideal

Local police and state courts bear most of the responsibility for the
problems described in this Article. Accordingly, they are well situated to
contain those problems.

321. Of course, a civil remedy is theoretically available for violating the constitutional right, but
the impediments to obtaining such a remedy make it impractical for the vast majority of those subject
to a brief, unconstitutional warrant check. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 337–41.
322. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2015, 2064 (2016).
323. See Nirej Sekhon, Mass Suppression: Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 51 GA. L.
REV. 429, 474 (2017).
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Local police departments can use their considerable discretion to
decline to enforce non-compliance warrants.324 As discussed above, the
Minneapolis Police Department adopted such a policy.325 A department
might, for example, issue a blanket policy that forbids officers from
making stops based solely upon non-compliance warrants for trafficrelated matters. Should record of such a warrant arise in the course of an
otherwise lawful stop, officers should warn the citizen but should not
arrest on the warrant alone. To discourage officers from making
unconstitutional stops to carry out warrant checks, a department might
refuse to process arrests that are based on such warrants alone. Many
police departments will hesitate to restrain officer discretion in this way
for the reasons suggested by the analysis in Part II. Even if a department
were to nominally embrace such a policy, it might not apply the policy
vigorously if at all. Police departments are notoriously opaque with regard
to policymaking and implementation. For that and other reasons, police
self-regulation has not been particularly effective—at least from a civil
rights standpoint—in other contexts, and there is little reason to think that
it would be different here. Judicial regulation is more promising.
State and local courts should embrace the magisterial ideal. As detailed
in Part I, this requires that they seriously consider a defendant’s interests
and balance them against the government’s interests before issuing a
warrant. Reconciling the magisterial ideal with the realities of mass justice
will be tricky. Criminal court judges will, for example, face countless
cases for low-level crimes and infractions in which defendants fail to
appear. In the absence of the defendant or any meaningful information
about the defendant, it will be difficult for a judge to be circumspect in
the way that the magisterial ideal presupposes. As a bare minimum, judges
should resist issuing warrants in a thoughtlessly mechanical way. A noncompliance warrant should not be a rote, default action. Non-compliance
warrants all too easily become just that in low-level cases because the
stakes in any particular case are low, and there is little legal or
bureaucratic resistance to issuing a warrant. As this Article has
endeavored to show, however, this practice has harmful consequences in
the aggregate.
Courts’ efforts to rein in non-compliance warrants will be greatly aided
in jurisdictions where the executive and legislative branches are
committed to reforming their practices with regard to low-level offenses.
For example, New York City has been reconsidering its commitment to
324. See supra section II.C.2.
325. See supra notes 255–57 and discussion.
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quality-of-life policing for many years. The city recently announced that
it would curtail its reliance on the desk summons that have generated over
a million outstanding warrants for FTAs.326 But even in the absence of
such political commitment, local courts have considerable power to
control non-compliance warrants’ issuance.
The magisterial ideal suggests that warrants ought to issue as a matter
of last resort after a judge has painstakingly reviewed a particular
defendant’s individual circumstances. As a practical matter, that will not
be possible in most mass justice courts for obvious reasons: there are too
many cases and too little information readily available about a (typically,
absent) defendant’s circumstances. Thus, the local judiciary should not
leave it to individual judges to satisfy the magisterial ideal in individual
cases. Instead, courts should address non-compliance warrants as a matter
of institutional policy and craft default principles that attempt to
approximate the magisterial ideal.
Basic, starting principles that courts might work from in devising
policy include the following:
(1) Courts should clearly state that non-compliance warrants are a last
resort where a non-compliant defendant threatens the orderly dispensation
of justice, not the first line of administrative recourse.
(2) Courts should identify procedural requirements that unnecessarily
generate FTAs such as requiring in-person appearance for infractions and
motions practice in criminal cases. As discussed above, FTAs constitute
a substantial portion of non-compliance warrants.327 Limiting the
circumstances in which an individual defendant need appear in court will
correspondingly limit the opportunities for FTAs to issue.328 For
defendants who are represented, courts might waive personal appearance
for all hearings save those where the defendant’s appearance is absolutely
necessary—for example, trial or a suppression motion in which she plans
to testify. For unrepresented parties—including those charged with traffic
offenses—courts might use technological solutions to permit defendants
to appear virtually when they would like to contest a citation or make a
showing that they are unable to pay.
(3) Courts might create blanket policies not to issue non-compliance
warrants for specific categories of offenses. For example, non-compliance
warrants may be gratuitous if state law creates an alternative, less intrusive
326. See Schwirtz, supra note 166.
327. See supra note 193.
328. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 48 (noting Ferguson court’s requirement that
defendants appear in person for broader range of infractions and offenses than required under state
law).
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mechanism for ensuring the vindication of the underlying infraction. For
example, in many states, outstanding traffic tickets must be paid before a
driver can renew her license.329 When such a mechanism exists for an
offense, courts might consider eliminating non-compliance warrants
altogether.
(4) Courts might create blanket policies not to issue non-compliance
warrants for specific categories of alleged offenders. For example,
someone who has no history of FTAs should receive the benefit of the
doubt should that individual fail to appear for a court date or allegedly fail
to satisfy a probation condition. For such an alleged offender, the court’s
default action might be to reschedule hearings and re-send notice to the
last known address.
Courts should also create administrative policies that aim to minimize
the harms generated by non-compliance warrants. Again, such policies
should be conceived through the lens of the magisterial ideal, with
sensitivity to local circumstances. Some rough principles from which such
policies might evolve include the following:
(1) Do not allow court clerks to issue non-compliance warrants. The
magisterial ideal presupposes that a neutral magistrate exercise judgment
before a warrant issues. Even if the moment of “neutral decision making”
is not exalted in the way that Supreme Court jurisprudence would
presuppose, the symbolic significance of a judge issuing warrants should
not be entirely set aside. Allowing non-judicial staff to issue warrants also
increases the risk of non-compliance warrants becoming a bureaucratic
default action.
(2) Allow court clerks to quash warrants issued for FTAs within some
clearly specified time after the warrant has issued. Court clerks have a
significant role to play in the management of non-compliance warrants.
Individuals who have outstanding warrants should be incentivized to have
those warrants quashed so that they do not remain outstanding
indefinitely. That might be accomplished by announcing clear rules about
how and when warrants may be quashed by a clerk. Allowing for an
administrative employee to quickly quash a warrant should make the
process less intimidating than having to appear before a judge. Clear rules
as to how and when warrants may be quashed administratively will also
serve to put individuals at ease that they will not be summarily arrested if
they visit the courthouse with an outstanding warrant.330
(3) Make it easy for individuals to ascertain whether there is an
outstanding warrant for their arrest. As suggested by the discussion in Part
329. See Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 16–17, 16 n.64.
330. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 47–49.
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II, non-compliance warrants are often issued and entered into databases
unbeknownst to the named individuals. Among certain communities, this
can create pervasive anxiety and mistrust of police and other public
institutions.331 Courts might use technology to create a non-threatening
mechanism for individuals to ascertain whether there is actually an
outstanding warrant for their arrest and on what grounds. The same system
ought to be used to apprise defendants of whether quashing the warrant is
administratively possible and what steps might be taken to accomplish
that end. Courts should assemble such systems carefully to ensure that
defendants’ privacy interests are not compromised—for example, by
making their warrant status readily accessible to everyone.
(4) Organize periodic amnesties for certain categories of outstanding
warrants. This is particularly viable for warrants that are based on some
failure to comply with a financial obligation to the state.332
A particular court might experiment with these and other proposals for
reducing the number of non-compliance warrants that are issued at any
given time. Far more important than embracing any particular proposal is
for jurisdictions to engage the non-compliance warrants issuance as an
important policy question.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s account of non-compliance warrants calls not only the
Fourth Amendment’s “warrant preference” into question, but also the
courts’ efficacy as police regulators. Courts do not have a command and
control relationship with the police. Courts both limit and generate police
discretion. This dynamic plays out not in the course of any one case but
over the life cycles of a multitude of cases. No single non-compliance
warrant generates incentives for the police to violate the Constitution or
measurably exacerbates the class and racial disparities that have become
endemic in criminal justice. That is likely what makes it easy for judges
to issue non-compliance warrants as a thoughtless, administrative act in
one case after another. It is in the aggregate that these warrants amplify
police discretion for the worse. If courts are to ameliorate the harms noncompliance warrants create, they must first recognize themselves as
policy makers, not just arbiters of individual cases.

331. See Goffman, supra note 269, at 343–44, 351–52, 354.
332. The city of Decatur, Georgia, for example, recently announced such an amnesty. See 2017
Amnesty Program, CITY OF DECATUR, http://www.decaturga.com/city-government/city-departments/
municipal-court/2016-amnesty-program [https://perma.cc/J2L7-83J6].
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Utah v. Strieff is a poor decision, not least because its reasoning is
unpersuasive. More troublesome is the Court’s continuing commitment to
withdrawing the Fourth Amendment from playing a role in regulating the
racial and class consequences of policing in the United States.333 State and
local courts should not take their cues from this opinion. With or without
Strieff, state and local courts are best positioned to craft solutions for the
harms non-compliance warrants create. These courts should not forsake
that opportunity just because the Supreme Court has given them
permission to do so.

333. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2051, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

